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ABSTRACT
Kannavara, Raghudeep. Ph.D., Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright State University, 2009. Design and Performance Analysis of a Secure Processor SCAN-SP with Crypto-Biometric Capabilities.

Secure computing is gaining importance in recent times as computing capability is increasingly becoming distributed and information is everywhere. Prevention of piracy and digital rights management has become very important. Information security is mandatory rather than an additional feature. Numerous
software techniques have been proposed to provide certain level of copyright
and intellectual property protection. Techniques like obfuscation attempt to
transform the code into a form that is harder to reverse engineer. Tamperproofing causes a program to malfunction when it detects that it has been modified. Software watermarking embeds copyright notice in the software code to
allow the owners of the software to assert their intellectual property rights. The
software techniques discourage software theft, can trace piracy, prove ownership, but cannot prevent copying itself. Thus, software based security firewalls
and encryption is not completely safe from determined hackers. This necessitates the need for information security at the hardware level, where secure processors assume importance. In this dissertation, a detailed architecture and instruction set of the SCAN-Secure Processor is proposed. The SCAN-SP is a
modified SparcV8 processor architecture with a new instruction set to handle
iv

image compression, encryption, information hiding based on SCAN methodology and biometric authentication based on Local Global Graph methodology.
A SCAN based methodology for encryption and decryption of 32 bit instructions and data is proposed. The modules to support the new instructions are
synthesized in reconfigurable logic and the results of FPGA synthesis are presented. The ultimate goal of the proposed work is a detailed study of the tradeoffs that exists between speed of execution and security of the processor. Designing a faster processor is not the goal of the proposed work, rather exploring
the

architecture

to

provide

security

v

is

of

prime

importance.
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CHAPTER ONE
Information security is perhaps one of the key responsibilities of mod-

ern software and hardware architects. The research on security is gaining importance as the number of embedded, networked and distributed computing
systems is increasing rapidly. Security critical systems require software applications to be run on secure processors that have capability to secure operations.
In this scenario, an integration of technologies like cryptography, hardware
design, software engineering and biometrics plays a definitive role in providing security to critical information. In this dissertation, we explore the design of
a secure processor architecture, called the SCAN-SP. We provide a detailed
analysis of the relevant issues in the processor design along with its performance evaluation. We analyze the tradeoffs that exist between providing increased security versus increased speed of execution.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter.2 offers a brief introduction to secure computing along with a detailed a survey of the current secure processor architectures in industry and academia. In chapter.3 we present
the new SCAN-SP architecture and the new instruction set. We present the
evaluation of the proposed SCAN-SP design with certain simulated benchmark
applications. We further, present the design and integration of FPGA modules
along with a new instruction set, to enable SCAN methodology based image
encryption, compression and information hiding in images. Chapter.4 provides
1

a survey of current biometric methodologies and a comparative evaluation of
the surveyed methodologies. Chapter.5 describes Local-Global graph methodology based voice, iris and fingerprint biometric authentication along with
FPGA implementation of critical sections of the LG graph methodology. We
also present the new instruction set to enable biometric authentication. Chapter.6 highlights the contribution of the dissertation and sets the conclusion to
the dissertation.

2

2

CHAPTER TWO
In this chapter a brief introduction to secure computing along with a

detailed survey of the current secure processor architectures in industry and
academia is presented.

2.1

Secure Computing
The secure computing model shown in Fig.2-1 is a single processor sys-

tem with external memory and peripherals. The processor is implemented on a
single ship integrated circuit (IC) and is assumed to be trusted and protected
from physical attacks i.e. its internal state cannot be tampered with or observed
directly by physical means. The processor contains secret information such as a
public key that identifies it and allows it to communicate securely with the outside world. The processor is protected by a tamper-sensing environment [2]
[30].
The trusted computing base (TCB) consists of the processor chip and
optionally some core parts of the operating system such as the security kernel.
The processor is used in a multitasking environment, which uses virtual memory and runs mutually mistrusting processes. External memory and peripherals are assumed to be un-trusted; they may be observed and tampered with at
will by an adversary. Additionally data values stored in off-chip memory are
encrypted. The encryption and decryption of data values is done by a hardware crypto-engine placed either between the cache and the external memory
3

or between the cache and the CPU core.

Fig. 2-1. Secure Computing Model

If the crypto-engine or Encryption Decryption Unit (EDU) is placed between the cache and the external main memory as seen in Fig.2-2, encryption
and decryption is done block wise, page wise or segment wise. This is because
a cache miss causes flushing of the cache and filling the cache with new data.
Since, data movement between the cache and the external main memory occurs
page wise or segment wise, encryption and decryption is implemented by employing a block cipher. In this case the cache contains unencrypted or plain text
instructions.

4

Fig. 2-2. EDU between Cache and External Memory

If the Encryption Decryption Unit is placed between the cache and the
CPU core as seen in Fig.2-3, encryption and decryption is done instruction
wise. Any branching in the instruction execution sequence requires the instruction to be fetched from the branched location in the cache. Therefore, the encryption or decryption technique has to accommodate the discontinuities in
program execution. A simple stream cipher may not be able to achieve the required encryption because of the jumps in program execution due to branching. Therefore each and every instruction may be encrypted as a separate entity, i.e. instruction wise encryption is implemented. In this case the cache contains encrypted instructions, which are decrypted just before execution in the
pipelined execution model.

Fig. 2-3. EDU between Cache and CPU Core

5

The TCB needs to ensure the integrity of memory accesses before it performs any operation or stores data into the external memory space and thus
memory integrity verification is required. Memory behaves like valid memory
if the value the processor loads from a particular address is the most recent
value that it has stored to that address [2]. Also the programs must be wellwritten not to leak secrets via memory access patterns.

2.2

Secure Processors
In this section we offer a review of secure processor designs currently in

the industry and the academia. The classification of secure processor designs is
based on the location of the crypto-engine necessary to implement encryption
or decryption of instructions and data. The crypto-engine can be placed onchip, in a single monolithic architecture or it can be placed off-chip, like an
FPGA based co-processor. We also review hybrid techniques that combine onchip crypto-engine with off-chip co-processor to provide enhanced security.

2.2.1 Monolithic Architecture
In this section we offer a review of secure processor designs currently in
the industry and the academia. The classification of secure processor designs is
based on the location of the crypto-engine necessary to implement encryption
or decryption of instructions and data. The crypto-engine can be placed onchip, in a single monolithic architecture or it can be placed off-chip, like an
FPGA based co-processor. We also review hybrid techniques that combine onchip crypto-engine with off-chip co-processor to provide enhanced security.
6

Bus encryption technique was first introduced by Best twenty five years
ago [4] [5] [6] [2]. Best proposed to consider the CPU as secure and consequently all data and addresses are in decrypted form inside the CPU and encrypted
outside the processor chip. A cipher unit is implemented on-chip and a secret
cipher key is located in an on-chip register.
Various patents exist in the industry. VLSI technology [7] [2] proposes
an architecture where data transfers to and from the external memory is done
page wise. All CPU requests are managed by a secure DMA unit and communications between external and internal memory use an encryption/decryption
core using block cipher techniques which is robust. Since the operating system
controls the DMA, this method is viable as long as the OS is trusted.
General Instrument Corporation [8][2] proposed to encrypt the memory
content with a triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) in block chaining mode
and to offer the possibility to authenticate the data coming from external memory using a keyed hash algorithm. Cipher block chaining methodology is robust but has severe CPU performance degradation for random external memory accesses.
Dallas Semiconductor proposed an architecture that implements 64 bit
triple DES block cipher coupled with rapid “zeroization” of secure information
as a tamper response to further strengthen the security feature [9], in their industrial product, DS5240. The older version of their product DS5002FP was
broken by the well known Markus G. Kuhn attack [29]. DS5002FP supported
address encryption along with data and instruction encryption but lacked true
7

DES encryption.
The Secure Blue secure processor [15] architecture proposed by IBM facilitates high volume Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Internet serving, scaling from
thousands to millions of independently active SSL sessions. The Secure Blue
architecture aims to offload SSL set-up protocol activity that is traditionally executed by dedicated co-processors to a scalable array of SSL handshake Protocol specific servers. Additionally, the actual encryption and decryption
processing is offloaded as well to a dedicated and scalable array of In-Line Encryption Engines. But the In-Line Encryption Engine is architected such that
requests and responses flowing to and from the transaction servers are in clear
text. But this does not make the processor secure by itself, since the instructions
being executed are not encrypted.
The innovations of LaGrande Technology [37] from Intel include domain separation, protected execution, sealed storage, a trusted channel to
graphics and input devices like mouse and keyboard, mechanisms for authenticating the launch of a protected environment and attestation of platform identity. Extensions to the IA-32 architecture allow for the creation of multiple execution environments, or partitions. This allows for the coexistence of a legacy
partition and a protected partition. The basis of this protection lies with the
TPM‟s (Trusted Platform Module) Storage Root Key (SRK), a public/private
key pair. Even though the processor provides for secure execution of programs,
the instructions by themselves are not encrypted.
The ARM-based BCM5890 [38] security applications processor from
8

Broadcom is a single-chip, trusted platform solution capable of executing application software in a secure environment. The BCM5890's secure memory
access system allows application code to be encrypted and digitally signed
prior to being stored in off-chip memory. The BCM5890 provides the user with
two operating modes - secure and open mode. In secure mode, the application
software has access to all the chip peripherals, while in open mode; access to
secure peripherals is limited. Context information is securely managed when
switching between operating modes. Specifications include 150 MHz operation
and 16-KB data and instruction cache with one-time programmable hardwareprotected key storage and Secure Assurance Logic (SAL).
The secure processor design based on Deep Code Scrambling approach
involves XORing the 32-bit instruction and data path with a 32 bit XOR key.
Multiple XOR keys can be used to secure multiple critical sections of the program running on the CPU. The XOR key corresponding to that session can be
stored on a special on chip register, accessible using a special instruction. This
approach supports running of both encrypted and non-encrypted versions of
the program in the same session using a special instruction to switch between
the secure and normal execution modes. Since only the critical sections are encrypted in this approach, this method offers better performance as compared to
other approaches. Jumps and branches during the encrypted sessions must be
addressed carefully by the programmer and necessary compiler support is desired in this approach.
Numerous academic projects also propose tamper resistant architec9

tures that include bus encryption. An internal permanent memory and logic
control unit and pipelined triple Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) block cipher is proposed in the work titled “Enhancing Security in the Memory Management Unit” [10]. The security management unit and the internal permanent
memory are added to an existing CPU core without significant loss of performance. The deciphering cost can be kept under 2, 5 %, with 8 kB I-cache for the
deepest pipeline and with 2 kB I-cache for the 4-stage pipeline (12-stage if prediction is used). Thus, it is not necessary to design a special CPU core for this
device, the software library can be preserved and the security management
unit can be adapted to several CPU technologies. But memory operations
(write operations) for smaller than block sizes, can degrade performance.
The XOM (Execute Only Memory) [11] project uses a pipelined AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) block cipher unit. Though the cipher unit features a low latency of 14 latency cycles, while maintaining a throughput of one
encrypted/decrypted data per clock cycle, no specific benchmarking has been
carried out since only latency does not inform about the overall system cost [2].
The decryption is carried after they are fetched from memory, and before they
are used by the CPU. As a result, the lengthened critical path causes serious
performance degradation.
The AEGIS [12] project implements a cipher unit composed by a pipelined AES (300,000) gates in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode. Since the CBC
corresponds to the cache block size, it allows for random access to external
memory since each cache block is ciphered separately in CBC mode. However
10

the fetched instruction cannot be provided to the processor until the entire
block is deciphered. By using Physical Random Functions, a way of protecting
and sharing secrets is proposed. In this project the bus encryption engine is
evaluated separately, therefore the given cost overhead in terms of performance and silicon area is more detailed [2]. The major drawback is the heavy
tradeoff between security and embedded constraints; estimated performance
overhead introduced by the encryption engine is 25%.
In the work titled “A Code Compression Method to Cope with Security
Hardware Overheads, Computer Architecture and High Performance Computing” [13], a code compression method, the IBC-EI (Instruction Based Compression with Encryption and Integrity Checking) modified to provide integrity
checking and encryption to secure processor memory transactions is presented.
The principle is to keep the code compressed and ciphered in memory, thus
reducing the memory footprint and providing more information of memory
access. This methodology increases hardware complexity with increased internal memory requirements due to compression with encryption.
The proponents of the work titled “Authentication Control Point and Its
Implications For Secure Processor Design” [14], seek to explore the relationship
between privacy and integrity protection in the context of modern out of order
processor design, by evaluating different designs that integrate software decryption and integrity verification into an out of order pipeline. The authors
provide an in depth analysis of security and performance trade-offs and implications of designs that include authentication-then-issue, authentication-then11

commit, authentication-then-write, authentication-then-fetch and authentication-then-commit + address obfuscation.
In their work titled “Fast secure processor for inhibiting software piracy
and tampering” [18] [20], the authors present a technique in which the cryptography computation is shifted off from the memory access critical path by using a different encryption scheme, namely “one-time pad” encryption, to produce the instructions and data cipher-text. With some additional on-chip storage, cryptography computations are carried in parallel with memory accesses,
minimizing performance penalty. The authors claim that their technique reduces the performance overhead from 16.7% for critical path cryptography to
1.28% for onetime pad cryptography. But the impact on the overall performance in multi-task systems and context switching is not well addressed. Also
the level of security achieved is not discussed in particular.
In their article titled “Efficient memory integrity verification and encryption for secure processors” [22], the authors propose a hardware mechanism for memory integrity verification and encryption for single chip secure
processors. Their encryption scheme uses onetime-pad encryption and time
stamps, and overlaps the decryption computation from the corresponding data
access, enabling the processor to overlap decryption computation with data
access and hide most of the decryption latency. But the integrity verification
mechanism offers significant performance advantages over existing ones only
when the checks are infrequent as in grid computing applications.
The work presented in “Architectural support for copy and tamper re12

sistant software” [26] seeks to explore some of the potential security issues as
one aims at processor designs to become more efficient, secure and flexible.
The authors claim that even though security carries a performance penalty, it is
possible to create a normal multi-tasking machine where nearly all applications
can be run in XOM mode using compartments and session keys to isolate independent software applications running on the same processor. But the drawback is that the underlying hardware needs to support a unique private key,
private memory and traps on cache misses. This leads to increased complexity
and increased on-chip memory requirement.
In general view, we see two representative designs depending on the
on-chip positioning of the crypto-engine. The crypto-engine can be placed between the cache and the memory management unit and alternatively, it can be
placed between the cache and the CPU. In the former case, encryption and decryption is done block-wise or page-wise, i.e. the cache contains decrypted data
and instructions, and in the latter case, decryption of instructions is implemented as a pipeline stage in the instruction execution path, i.e. the instruction
is decrypted just before it is decoded and data encrypted before it is stored on
the on-chip cache.

2.2.2 Co-processor based Architecture
In “Single-chip FPGA implementation of a cryptographic co-processor”
[27], the authors present an implementation of a symmetric key crypto system
(AES), a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) and a method for providing digital signatures and key exchange using public key cryptography (RSA) on a single Xi13

linx virtex-2000E FPGA. A typical application would be as a co-processor for
accelerating cipher operations in the TLS and IPSec protocols. The authors
claim that the generic communicating interface to the design allows for the addition of new ciphers to the architecture without significant modifications.
Proposed future work for this implementation involves adding a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) based on a hash algorithm to the system,
which is currently not implemented.
On similar lines in “A reconfigurable public-key cryptography coprocessor” [28], the authors propose a RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) co-processor based on Montgomery algorithm with reconfigurable characteristic. In this work, a new scalable and unified coprocessor for both RSA
and ECC based on Montgomery algorithm is proposed. The coprocessor can
perform the modular multiplication of RSA and point multiplication of ECC. It
can implement modular multiplication with the bit length from 32 to 512, and
point multiplication of ECC with the bit length from 32 to 256 without any
modification for the hardware architecture.
In “A design of hardware cryptographic co-processor” [29], the authors
present an FPGA design of general purpose crypto-coprocessor, which is capable of selecting different algorithms through programming and performing
crypto operations like key management, data encryption and decryption. The
authors raise concern relating to processing speed for hardware implementation of algorithm. Although, hardware implementations usually run at higher
speed than software implementations, taking the reconfigurable character of
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the co-processor into account, the advantage of the co-processor‟s processing
speed may be lower. So there is a trade-off between speed and reconfigurable
character of the co-processor.
In all the co-processor based crypto engine designs, the communication
between the co-processor and the microcontroller is still the weakest link since
the crypto engine is housed off-chip. A single chip VLSI solution where the microcontroller core and the crypto-engine are integrated is preferred to avoid
concerns relating to the security of the co-processor.

2.2.3 Hybrid Architecture
The “SCAN-Secure Processor” [32] presents a monolithic secure processor architecture based on encryption of the 32-bit bus path using SCAN methodology and later on, XORing this encrypted bus path with a 32 bit XOR key
to achieve further encryption strength. The processor also supports image
compression, image encryption and information hiding in images based on
SCAN algorithms. The crypto engine for encryption and decryption of instructions and data is housed on-chip, between the cache and the CPU, while the
hardware to implement image compression, image encryption and information
hiding in images is implemented on an off-chip FPGA co-processor. A single
chip VLSI implementation of all the modules is desired to increase performance and security.

2.3

Comparative Survey
In this section, we set up comparative survey tables to compare the var15

ious methods reviewed in the previous section. Table.1 lists the surveyed architectures with their abbreviations. To evaluate the surveyed designs we use the
following features: Simplicity (F1), Complexity (F2), Originality (F3), Real application (F4), Real time processing (F5), Product (F6), Computational requirements (F7), User friendliness (F8), Performance and tests on real cases (F9), Reliability (F10), Robustness (F11), Security levels (F12), Requires training to user
(F13), Further improvements (F14), Implementation (F15) and Prototype (F16).
For each feature a weight is assigned which reflects its importance from the
user‟s and the engineer‟s view as seen in Table 2 (weights table). We grade each
methodology, if possible with a value (xi) between 1 and 10 as seen in Table 3
(scores table). The scores are assigned with 10 standing for highest score and 1
standing for the lowest score applicable for that feature. If we don‟t grade one
characteristic, we make it 0, that means that the characteristic is not available or
we don‟t have enough information. Using the formula T 

N

w x / N  b , a
i 1

i i

total score of each methodology is calculated, where „i‟ refers to a specific characteristic, „N‟ is the total number of characteristics for each system, „b‟ is bias
(for now, b=0) and „wi‟ is the average weight from the weights table.

Table 2-1. List of Surveyed Secure Processor Architectures

ARCHITECTURE
ABBREVIATION
AEGIS: Architecture for Tamper-Evident and TamperM1
Resistant Processing
Single-chip FPGA implementation of a cryptographic
M2
co-processor
A reconfigurable public-key cryptography coprocessor
M3
A design of hardware cryptographic co-processor
M4
Secure Processor: Deep Code Scrambling
M5
SCAN Secure Processor
M6
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Fast secure processor for inhibiting software piracy and
tampering
Secure Blue: An Architecture for Scalable, Reliable
High Volume SSL Internet Server
DS5240 High-Speed Secure Microcontroller - Maxim/Dallas Semiconductor
Secure memory management unit for microprocessor
Secure processor with external memory using block
chaining and block reordering
A Code Compression Method to Cope with Security
Hardware Overheads
Authentication Control Point and Its Implications For
Secure Processor Design
Efficient memory integrity verification and encryption
for secure processors
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant
software
LaGrande Technology Architectural Overview
BCM5890: Secure Applications Processor

M7
M8
M9
M10
M11
M12
M13
M14
M15
M16
M17

Table 2-2. Weights Table (Secure Processor Architectures)

F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6

F7

F8

F9

F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16

1

1

10

10

10

7

10

10

10

10

10

10

9

9

9

10

7

10

10

9

9

8

10

10

10

10

7

10

9

9

5.5 5.5 4

10

10

9.5 8

9

10

10

10

10

8.5

9.5

9

9

USER'S
2
PERSPECTIVE
ENGINEER'S
9
PERSPECTIVE
AVERAGE

Table 2-3. Scores Table (Secure Processor Architectures)

F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 Total
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
M11
M12
M13
M14
M15
M16
M17

2
4
4
5
6
7
7
5
7
7
7
6
7
6
6
7
6

9
7
7
6
5
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
7
6
7
7
7

9
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
8
8
8

7
8
8
7
8
7
8
9
9
9
9
7
6
6
7
9
9

7
7
7
8
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
8
8

1
1
1
1
10
1
1
10
10
10
10
1
1
1
1
10
10

9
8
8
8
7
7
8
7
8
8
8
9
7
8
8
8
8

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
6
8
8

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
6
8
8

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
8
8

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
6
8
8
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9
7
7
7
8
7
7
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
8
8

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
6
8
8
8
8
6
7

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

3
3
3
3
6
3
3
9
9
9
9
3
3
3
3
9
9

8
7
7
7
8
7
7
9
9
9
9
7
7
7
7
9
9

876
837
837
837
875
830
863.5
991.5
1011
1011
1011
851.5
825.5
822.5
846
1015
1018

Final
Total
46.11
44.05
44.05
44.05
46.05
43.68
45.45
52.18
53.18
53.18
53.18
44.82
43.45
43.29
44.53
53.39
53.55

Fig. 2-4. Comparative Scores Chart (Secure Processor Architectures)

The scores from the evaluation Table.2-3 are presented in Fig.2-4, as a
column chart, for easy comprehension. Evaluating the final score for each methodology in Table 3, we find that the commercially available secure processor
architectures score better as compared to the academically available designs in
terms of the tradeoff between performance and security. This is because the
commercially available secure processors are used in various devices and have
been implemented practically. It is also observed that monolithic architectures
where the crypto-engine is placed on-chip, provides better security and performance as compared to techniques which propose co-processor based cryptoengine. This is because the communication bus between the co-processor and
the CPU can be compromised and concerns relating to the security of the coprocessor need to be addressed.
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2.4

Conclusion
In the previous section, recent trends in secure-crypto processor designs

were presented. Considering all the above surveyed architectures, we can conclude that the trade-offs between security, efficiency, complexity and flexibility
is an important aspect that needs to be considered based on application before
the design and architecture of the secure-crypto processor is proposed. Of
course, security carries a performance penalty; as security measures in the architecture increase, the hardware complexity also increases and compromise on
flexibility and speed of operation is necessitated. It is also important to mention
that our comparative study does not intend to point one or more designs better
than others, which requires to run same applications under same conditions on
these secure processor designs, but to indicate the status of the current performance of these designs and their potential improvements if desirable.
Looking at the tables, one could argue that the criterion "Security Levels
(F12)" in its own right could supersede all other ones because a processor
which is "Original (F3)", “User friendly (F8)" and "Simple (F1)" can rank higher
than one which supports more "Security levels (F12)", is "Robust (F11)" and is
tested on "Real cases (F9)", if all other remaining scores are the same. This
means that providing security is not just an act of securing data, but is a broader panorama that encompasses human perception and information assimilation, human interaction with machines and the social issues involved with providing security that may be specific to the application that needs to be secured.
It is worth noting that a security system is only as strong as its weakest link.
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3

CHAPTER THREE
In this chapter, we present a detailed architecture and instruction set of

the SCAN secure processor and its cryptographic, steganographic and data
compression capabilities. The SCAN secure processor is a modified SparcV8
processor architecture with new instruction set to handle image compression,
encryption and information hiding based on SCAN methodology. The modules
for image compression, encryption and information hiding are synthesized in
reconfigurable logic. We propose to implement the above mentioned modules
in an off-chip FPGA co-processor. The IEEE compliant VHDL code is generated
using Matlab version 7 Simulink HDL Coder. The synthesis of the reconfigurable architecture is done using the Matlab generated VHDL code and XILINX
ISE ver. 9.1i. The encryption and decryption of the 32-bit instruction and data is
achieved using the SCAN based methodology, implemented by an on chip
crypto-engine.
The complete architecture demands a seamless coupling of hardware
and software to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum performance. The
cycle accurate simulation of the SCAN encrypted instruction execution was
achieved by modifying the SparcV8 simulator provided by the ArchC team
[39]. ArchC is a simple language, capable of describing processor architecture
as well as a memory hierarchy that follows SystemC syntax style. SystemC is
among a group of design languages and extensions being proposed to raise the
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abstraction level for hardware design and verification. SystemC is entirely
based on C/C++ and the complete source code for the simulation kernel is
freeware [40].
Integration of capabilities like data compression, encryption and information hiding in secure processor architecture addresses the need for providing enhanced security, minimum memory requirement for data archival and
secure transmission of compressed data. In this entire chapter, we consider images of size 128x128 with 8 bit depth, unless otherwise mentioned.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gives a brief description
of SCAN methodology and its applications. Section 3.2 gives a brief description
of SparcV8 processor architecture and its features. Section 3.3 describes the
SCAN processor architecture. Section 3.4 describes the FPGA co-processor interface along with new instruction set to handle the proposed hardware enhancements. Section 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 describes the FPGA co-processor for the
image compression, encryption and information hiding modules respectively.
Section 3.8 presents the results of XILINX ISE synthesis of the above mentioned
modules. Section 3.9 describes the secure computing feature of the SCAN secure processor along with the cycle accurate simulation results. Section 3.10
presents the performance analysis of the SCAN-Secure Processor based on certain Simulated Benchmark Programs. Section 3.11 discusses the compiler requirements to support the proposed architecture. Section 3.12 provides the
conclusion of this work.
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3.1

SCAN Methodology
SCAN is a formal language-based, two-dimensional spatial accessing

methodology that can represent and generate a large number of scanning paths
easily. The SCAN language is defined by a grammar and has a set of basic scan
patterns, a set of transformations, and a set of rules to compose simple scan
patterns to obtain complex scan patterns. The rules for building complex scan
patterns from simple scan patterns are specified by the production rules of the
grammar of the SCAN language. The SCAN language has applications in information compression, information encryption, and information hiding. The
basic scan patterns are shown in Fig. 3-1 and Fig. 3-2.
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Fig. 3-1. Basic SCAN Patterns
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In this chapter, FPGA coprocessor architecture capable of implementing
the SCAN based algorithms for image compression, encryption and information hiding is presented along with new instructions to implement the same.
Also SCAN methodology based pipelined encryption and decryption of instructions and data is presented.

3.2

SparcV8 Processor
SPARC [37] is a CPU instruction set architecture, derived from a re-

duced instruction set computer lineage. SPARC features a linear, 32 bit address
space with a few and simple instructions, 32 bits wide. There are only three basic instruction formats, and they feature uniform placement of op-code and
register address fields. Only load and store instructions access memory and
I/O. The addressing modes include “register + register” or “register + immediate” and triadic register operations, which operate on two register operands
(or one register and a constant), and place the result in a third register. There
also exists a large “windowed” register file, which allows a program to see 8
global integer registers plus a 24-register window at any instant. These windowed registers act as a cache for procedure arguments, local values, and return addresses. The SPARC architecture also provides for a separate floating
point register file, configurable by software into 32 single precision (32 bit), 16
double precision (64 bit), 8 quad precision registers (128 bit) or a mixture thereof. Trap handling is done through a vectored table that causes allocation of a
fresh register window in the register file. In case of the delayed control transfer
instructions, the processor always fetches the next instruction after a delayed
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control transfer instruction. It either executes the instruction or not depending
on the control transfer instruction‟s “annul” bit. While executing a multiprocessor synchronization instruction, a single instruction performs an atomic
read and then set memory operation; another performs an atomic exchange
register with memory operation. The SPARC architecture defines a
straightforward coprocessor instruction set, in addition to the floating point
instruction set. The proposed SCAN-SP is a modified SparcV8 architecture to
accommodate secure computing features.

3.3

SCAN-SP Architecture – Crypto Capabilities
In this section, the SCAN-SP architecture with respect to its crypto ca-

pabilities is described. The FPGA based co-processor architecture to implement
image compression, encryption and information hiding is presented along with
the new instruction set to handle the off-chip co-processor. The reconfigurable
architecture of the above mentioned modules is synthesized on the Xilinx
XCV600 FPGA. Also, SCAN based methodology for encryption and decryption
of instructions is presented along with performance analysis of the proposed
architecture. Further, compiler issues to support the proposed architecture are
also discussed.

3.3.1 FPGA Co-Processor Interface
In this section, we describe the FPGA co-processor interface along with
new instructions to implement image compression, encryption and information
hiding. The new instructions enable the operation of the FPGA based co24

processor to implement the above mentioned operations. The coprocessor instruction set for SparcV8 includes support for a single, implementationdependent coprocessor. The coprocessor has its own set of registers, the actual
configuration of which is implementation-defined. Coprocessor load/store instructions are used to move data between the coprocessor registers and memory. To enable a coprocessor, the enable coprocessor (EC) bit (Bit 13) in the Program Status Register (PSR) is 1. If a coprocessor is not present, the enable coprocessor (EC) bit in the PSR is 0 and a coprocessor instruction generates a cp
disabled trap. All of the coprocessor data and control/status registers are optional and implementation-dependent. The coprocessor working registers are
accessed via load/store coprocessor and CPop1/CPop2 format instructions.
The Sparc architecture also provides instruction support for reading and writing a Coprocessor State Register (CSR) and a coprocessor deferred-trap queue
(CQ).
A tightly coupled coprocessor architecture with dedicated data-path
and a local memory system is required. The coprocessor interacts with the
main processor through asynchronous FIFOs which enable the coprocessor to
be implemented with a clock frequency different from the processor system.
The coprocessor is integrated into the processor subsystem using a dedicated
coprocessor interface as shown in Fig.3-3. A dedicated coprocessor interface
provides higher data rate between processor cache and the coprocessor and
provides special purpose instructions to handle communication with the coprocessor.
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Fig. 3-3. FPGA Co-Processor Interface for Crypto Operations

The CPop1 and CPop2 instruction format is as shown in Fig.3-4, as given in the SparcV8 manual.
Opcode
op3
Operation
CPop1 110110 Coprocessor Operate
CPop2 110111 Coprocessor Operate

Fig. 3-4. CPop1 & CPop2 Instruction Format

The suggested assembly syntax for the above instructions is as shown
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in Fig.3-5.
Copop1
Copop2

opc,
opc,

cregrs1, cregrs2, cregrd
cregrs1, cregrs2, cregrd

Fig. 3-5. Suggested Assembly Syntax

The new coprocessor instructions to enable SCAN based image compression, encryption and information hiding are explained next. Data transfer
across the external memory and the coprocessor memory is implemented by
transferring four bytes of data simultaneously on the 32 bit data bus. The four
image bytes on the data bus are decrypted using the SCAN methodology and
the XOR key before being stored in the coprocessor memory. Similarly the four
image bytes are encrypted using the SCAN methodology and the XOR key before being stored in the external memory. The new instructions are explained
next:
LOADIMG – The load image (LOADIMG) instruction moves the image
file from external memory into the coprocessor memory.
STOREIMG – The store image (STOREIMG) instruction removes the
image file from the coprocessor memory and stores it in the external memory.
LOADMSG – The load message (LOADMSG) instruction moves the
message file from external memory into the coprocessor memory.
STOREMSG – The store message (STOREMSG) instruction removes the
message file from the coprocessor memory and stores it in the external memory.
LOADKEY1 – The load key1 (LOADKEY1) instruction moves the first
27

encryption key from the external memory into the coprocessor memory.
LOADKEY2 – The load key2 (LOADKEY2) instruction moves the
second encryption key from the external memory into the coprocessor memory.
LOADSEED – The load seed (LOADSEED) instruction loads the seed
needed by the random number generator of the encryption and decryption
modules. This instruction is followed immediately by the seed value as an immediate operand.
CMPRS_IMG – The compress image (CMPRS_IMG) instruction compresses the image and the result is available in the coprocessor memory. The
image file should be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction
can be issued.
DCMPRS_IMG – The decompress image (DCMPRS_IMG) instruction
decompresses the compressed image and the result is available in the coprocessor memory. The compressed image file should be present in the coprocessor
memory before this instruction can be issued.
ENCRYPT – The encrypt image (ENCRYPT) instruction encrypts the
image and the result is available in the coprocessor memory. The image file
should be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.
DECRYPT – The decrypt image (DECRYPT) instruction decrypts the
image and the result is available in the coprocessor memory. The encrypted
image file should be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction
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can be issued.
INFOHIDE – The information hide (INFOHIDE) instruction embeds the
message into the image file. The result of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. Both the message file and the image file should be present
in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.
INFOEXTRACT – The information extract (INFOEXTRACT) instruction
extracts the embedded message from the cover image. The image file needs to
be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued. The
extracted message is available in the coprocessor memory.
CMPRS_ENCR – The compress and encrypt image (CMPRS_ENCR) instruction compresses the image and encrypts the compressed image. The result
of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. The image file should
be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.
DECR_DCMPRS

–

The

decrypt

and

decompress

image

(DECR_DCMPRS) instruction decrypts the input image and further decompresses the result of decryption. The result of this operation is available in the
coprocessor memory. The image file should be present in the coprocessor
memory before this instruction can be issued.
INFOHIDE_CMPRS – The information hide and compress (INFOHIDE_CMPRS) instruction embeds the message into the cover image and compresses the resultant image. Both the message file and the image file should be
present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.
DCMPRS_INFOEXTRACT – The decompress and information extract
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(DCMPRS_INFOEXTRACT) instruction decompresses the compressed image
and extracts the message from the decompressed image. The result of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. The compressed image file
should be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.
INFOHIDE_ENCR – The information hide and encrypt (INFOHIDE_
ENCR) instruction embeds the message into the cover image and further encrypts the cover image. The result of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. Both the message file and the image file should be present in the
coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.
DECR_INFOEXTRACT

–

The

decrypt

and

information

extract

(DECR_INFOEXTRACT) instruction decrypts the encrypted image and extracts
the embedded message from the decrypted image. The result of this operation
is available in the coprocessor memory. The encrypted image file should be
present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.
INFOHIDE_CMPRS_ENCR – The information hide, compress and encrypt instruction (INFOHIDE_CMPRS_ENCR) embeds the message file into
the cover image file and further compresses and encrypts this resultant image.
The result of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. Both the
image file and the message file should be present in the coprocessor memory
before this instruction can be issued.
DECR_DCMPRS_INFOEXTRACT – The decrypt, decompress and information extract (DECR_DCMPRS_INFOEXTRACT) instruction decrypts the
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encrypted image and further decompresses it and extracts the embedded message. The result of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. The
compressed, encrypted image file should be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.
In the following sections the modules for image compression, encryption and information hiding are described. The size of image considered is
128x128 bytes throughout this chapter, unless otherwise mentioned.

3.3.2 Lossless Image Compression
The lossless image compression algorithm consists of four main steps.
These steps are (1) scanning and prediction (2) scan path encoding (3) context
modeling (4) arithmetic coding. The image is first partitioned into blocks of
size 2k2k, k2. Each block is then scanned with various scan paths and pixel
values are predicted using different predictors along the scan paths i.e., for
each scan path, the sum of absolute values of prediction errors (the difference
in pixel intensity values) and the number of bits needed to encode the scan
path are computed. For each block, the scan path which minimizes the prediction errors and encoding bits is chosen as the best scan path of the block. Recursive hardware to find the best scan path is presented in the work by Kachris, Maniccam, Dollas and Bourbakis [33].
In this chapter a reconfigurable architecture for the BlockError() function, for scanning and prediction, and the Context() function, for context modeling, is presented. The BlockError() function is as shown next.

31

(E, L) = BlockError(I, kt)
Inputs: Image block I, scan path kt
Outputs: Sum E of absolute values of prediction errors along kt, Sequence L of
prediction errors along kt
{
Let E = 0, L = 
Scan block I using scan path kt and at each pixel p do
{
Determine predictor at p and determine predictor neighbors

{q, r}

Let s be the pixel which was scanned before p
If q and r are already scanned
e = p – (q + r)/2
Else
e=p–s
E = E + Abs(e), L = Append(L , e)
}
Return (E, L)
}
The image of size 128x128 is partitioned into 4 blocks of size 64x64
which can be processed in parallel by the BlockError() function implemented on
the FPGA. Matlab code to find the prediction errors, embedded in the Simulink
subsystem, as seen in Fig.3-6, is used to generate the IEEE compliant VHDL
code that can be used to synthesize the FPGA for finding the prediction errors.
All the prediction errors are buffered and the absolute sum of the prediction errors is written into a register on the FPGA. This register is continuously updated with the absolute sum of the prediction errors and the final
value is obtained in this register at the 4096th clock cycle since one clock cycle
is required to find the prediction error at one pixel „p‟. Even though all these
four blocks fit into a single XCV600 with 2.3% logic utilization, there is a 92%
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IO utilization, which prevents us from duplicating further blocks on the same
FPGA. The best scan path is the path with the least absolute sum of prediction
errors. This operation is continuously repeated until all the basic SCAN patterns {C, D, O, S} including {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are exhausted. Multiple FPGAs
with four blocks each can be used to achieve maximum parallelization and exhaust all the basic SCAN patterns in 4096 clock cycles. By making the circuit
edge triggered, it is possible to reduce the number of clock cycles by half.

Fig. 3-6. Simulink Model to find Prediction Errors
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Once the best scan path and the sequence of prediction errors along the
scan path are determined for each block, the best scan path is encoded and the
sequence of contexts of prediction errors along the best scan path are computed
using Context() function which is described next.
L = Context(I, P)
Inputs: Image block I, Scan path P
Output: Sequence L of contexts along P
{
Let L = 
Scan I using scan path P and at each pixel p do
{
Determine predictor at p and determine context neighbors {q,r,s}
Let u, v be the first and second pixels which were scanned before p
If q, r, s are already scanned
a = (|q – r| + |r – s|)/2
Else
a = |u – v|
Let b = 0 if 0  a  2, b = 1 if 3  a  8, b = 2 if 9  a  15, b = 3 if a  16
L = Append(L, b)
}
Return L
}
The values of „q‟, „r‟ and „s‟ are previously buffered and at every clock
cycle the context at pixel „p‟ is calculated. FLAG is set to 1 implies that the „q‟,
„r‟ and „s‟ are already scanned else not. The context „b‟ at „p‟ is appended to a
buffer. The method to find predictor values, predictor neighbors and context
neighbors (q, r, and s) is explained in [35]. Four blocks can be processed in parallel by parallelizing the Context() function. Matlab code to find the context,
embedded in the Simulink subsystem, as seen in Fig.3-7, is used to generate the
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IEEE compliant VHDL code that can be used to synthesize the FPGA to find
the context.

Fig. 3-7. Simulink Model to find the Context

Once the sequence of prediction errors and the corresponding sequence
of contexts are determined for each block, the prediction error sequence and
the corresponding context sequence of the whole image are obtained by ap35

pending the error sequences of blocks together and context sequences of blocks
together in the C0 order in which the blocks were processed. The prediction
errors of the whole image are then encoded with context based adaptive arithmetic coding using ArithmeticCode() function which is described in [35]. Arithmetic coding is a method for lossless data compression. It is a form of variablelength entropy encoding that converts a string into another representation that
represents frequently used characters using fewer bits and infrequently used
characters using more bits, with the goal of using fewer bits in total.
After arithmetic coding is completed, the encoder sends a header information containing number of bits to the decoder and then sends the bits sequentially to the memory. The header of the compressed image provides information on the SCAN path chosen, the size of the image and the values of the
first two pixels. This information is used to decompress the compressed image.

3.3.3 Image Encryption and Decryption
SCAN methodology offers a symmetric private key encryption. Image
encryption using the SCAN methodology and its reconfigurable architecture is
discussed in this section. The image encryption method is based on permutation of the pixels of the image and replacement of the pixel values. The permutation is done by scan patterns generated by the SCAN methodology. The pixel values are replaced using a simple substitution rule which adds confusion
and diffusion properties. The permutation and substitution operations are applied in intertwined manner and iteratively producing an iterated product cipher. The encryption is done by Encrypt() function which is described next.
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J = Encrypt(I, N, k1, k2, p, m)
Inputs: Image I, Image size NN (N = 2n, n2)
Encryption keys k1 and k2, Random seed integer p
Number of encryption iterations m
Output: Encrypted image J
{
Let A, D, G be two dimensional arrays of size NN and let B, C, E, F, R be
one dimensional arrays of length NN
Generate NN random integers between 0 and 255 using random seed p and
assign to R
Copy I into A
Repeat m times
{
Read pixels of A using key k1 and write into B
C[1]=B[1], C[j]=(B[j]+((C[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256 for 2jNN
Read pixels of C and write into D using spiral key s0
Read pixels of D using diagonal key d0 and write into E
F[1]=E[1], F[j]=(E[j]+((F[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256 for 2jNN
Read pixels of F and write into G using key k2
}
Copy G into J and return J
}
The encryption key actually consists of four components, namely, the
two user specified scan keys k1 and k2, the random seed integer p, and the
number of encryption iterations m. These four encryption key components are
known to both the sender and the receiver before the communication of encrypted image, via an un-trusted media. The encryption algorithm uses four
scan keys to increase the complexity of pixel rearrangement. The keys k1 and
k2 are specified by the user as part encryption key. The other two keys spiral
s0 and diagonal d0 are fixed as part of encryption algorithm. These two keys
s0 and d0 are chosen because they have opposite directions of scanning and
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hence increase the complexity of pixel rearrangement caused by the user specified keys k1 and k2.
A good compromise between block size and SCAN keys is needed in
order to achieve a combination of high encryption and high performance. In
the architecture presented here, images of size 128x128 are partitioned into
blocks of 64x64 for the purpose of encryption. The encryption process is iterative to improve the strength of encryption. Five iterations of the encryption
process using different seeds for the random number generator provide a high
encryption quality. The reconfigurable architecture of the substitution block of
Encrypt() function is as shown in Fig.3-8.

Fig. 3-8. Simulink Model for Encryption (Pixel Value Substitution)

The bitwise „and‟ with 255 is equivalent modulus operation with 256
and is easier to implement in hardware. Though 16 bit multiplier is used in the
implementation, only 8 bits of the LSB contain the needed value after the bit
wise „and‟ operation. Four such blocks of encryption to enable parallel encryption of the 4 image blocks are used. The reconfigurable architecture of the substitution block of decryption process is as shown in Fig.3-9.
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Fig. 3-9. Simulink Model for Decryption (Pixel Value Substitution)

Similarly four such blocks for decryption are used to enable parallel decryption. A clear description of the address generation units that interface with
the encryption and decryption modules is presented by Dollas, Kachris and
Bourbakis [38].

3.3.4 Information Hiding
The main idea of the image information hiding method is to identify the
complex regions of the cover image and embed the secret data into those regions. The bits from the secret data are embedded into variable number of
least significant bits of the pixels in complex regions depending on their complexity. The bits from the secret data are embedded into complex regions in
random order determined by the secret SCAN key chosen by the user [35]. The
embedding algorithm consists of four main steps. These steps are (1) complexity identification of cover image (2) SCAN rearrangement of cover image and
complexity matrix (3) bit embedding of secret data into rearranged cover image
(4) reverse SCAN rearrangement of rearranged embedded image. The algorithm to identify the complexity of the cover image chosen to embed the message is as described next.
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Complexity(I, C, k1, k2, k3, k4)
Inputs: Cover image I
Threshold values 0k1k2k3k4<255
Output: Complexity matrix C
{
Let C[i][j] = 0 for 1iheight(I), 1jwidth(I)
For (i = 2 to height(I)-1, i = i+2, j = 2 to width(I)-1, j = j+2)
{
d=

1 8
 abs( NBk ( I [i][ j ])  NB(k 1) mod8 ( I [i][ j ]))
8 k 1

Let C[i][j] = 0,1,2,3,4 if 0d<k1, k1d<k2, k2d<k3, k3d<k4, k4d255,
respectively
}
}
Matlab code to identify the complexity of the cover image, embedded in
the Simulink subsystem, along with the Simulink subsytem, is used to generate
the IEEE compliant VHDL code that can be used to synthesize the FPGA for
identification of complexity of cover image.
The embedding capacity i.e. ((embedded data size)/(cover image
size))100% is at most 12.5% because at most 4 least significant bits of at most 1
in 4 pixels of the cover image are used to embed data. In the bit embedding
step, the secret data is embedded into the rearranged cover image. The secret
data is a bit stream which can come from binary/grayscale/color/compressed
image, text, sound, video, copyright information, and etc. The length of the bit
stream is less than or equal to the total available embedding space (in bits)
which was made known to the user after the complexity identification of the
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cover image. Bit embedding is done by EmbedBit() function which is described
next.
EmbedBit(I, C, M)
Inputs: Rearranged cover image I
Rearranged complexity matrix C
Secret data bit stream M
Output: Bits of M are embedded into I
{
Let p = length(M)
For (i = 1 to height(I), j = 1 to width(I))
{
If p equals 0
Stop embedding
Else
k = minimum{C[i][j], p}
Replace k least significant bits of I[i][j] with next k bits from M
p=p-k
}
}
In the reconfigurable architecture the complexity values are initially
calculated and stored in a FIFO buffer. Based on the buffered and rearranged
complexity values, the bits in the image pixel are replaced with the message
bits as described in the algorithm. Bit embedding is implemented using „bitand‟ operation to clear the LS bits of the image byte and „bitor‟ operation to
embed the message data in the image byte, based on the calculated „k‟ values.
Every cycle, one image pixel is embedded with the message based on the calculated „k‟ values. Matlab code to embed the message in the cover image based
on the identified complexity is embedded in the Simulink subsystem as seen in
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Fig.3-10. This embedded Matlab function along with the Simulink subsystem is
used to generate the IEEE compliant VHDL code that can be used to synthesize
the FPGA that implements message embedding.

Fig. 3-10. Simulink Model to Embed Message

In the bit extraction step, the bits of the secret data are extracted from
the rearranged embedded image using ExtractBit() function, described next.
ExtractBit(I, C, n, M)
Inputs: Rearranged embedded image I
Rearranged complexity matrix C
Length n of secret data in bits
Output: Secret data M
{
For (i = 1 to height(I), j = 1 to width(I))
{
If n equals 0
Stop extracting
Else
k = minimum{C[i][j], n}
Extract k least significant bits of I[i][j] and append to M
n=n-k
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}
}

Fig. 3-11. Simulink Model to Extract Message

A „bitand‟ operation is used on the image bytes to extract the message
bits from the cover image. The complexity identification step is the same as
used before in the EmbedBit() function. The complexity matrices are the same
because the 8-neighbors of each embedding candidate pixel are left unchanged.
Note that the length (in bits) of the secret data is needed by ExtractBit() function, and this length is sent to the receiver in the header of the embedded image. Matlab code to extract the message in the cover image based on the identified complexity is embedded in the Simulink subsystem as seen in Fig.3-11.
This embedded Matlab function along with the Simulink subsystem is used to
generate the IEEE compliant VHDL code that can be used to synthesize the
FPGA that implements message extraction.
If the presence of secret data is detected, the data cannot be read or understood without knowing the embedding SCAN key, because the data is embedded in random order specified by the SCAN key. Therefore, the method is
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robust against passive attacks which are aimed at only detecting and reading
the secret data. But the method is not robust against active attacks which are
aimed at destroying the secret data without reading it. Since an attacker knows
possible pixel locations where secret data can be embedded, the attacker can
change the four least significant bits of all those pixels, thereby destroying the
secret data.

3.3.5 Results of FPGA Synthesis
The results of XILINX ISE synthesis of FPGA modules to support the
image compression, encryption and information hiding are tabulated in this
section. Table.3-1 presents the synthesis results of compression module. Table.3-2 presents the synthesis results of the encryption and decryption modules. Table.3-3 presents the synthesis results of the modules to embed and extract message in the cover image. XCV600 from the Virtex family was selected
for the purpose of FPGA synthesis.

Table 3-1. FPGA Synthesis: Compression Module

Module
Block Error Module
(four blocks)
Context Module
(four blocks)

Slices of
Virtex XCV600

%
occupied

164

2.3

148

2.14

Table 3-2. FPGA Synthesis: Encrypt/Decrypt Module

Module
Encrypt Module (one block)
Decrypt Module (one block)

Slices of
Virtex XCV600
33
33

44

%
occupied
0.47
0.47

Table 3-3. FPGA Synthesis: Information Hide/Extract Module

Module
Embed Module
Extract Module
Complexity Module

Slices of
Virtex XCV600
40
26
80

%
occupied
0.57
0.37
1.15

Table.3-4 provides the number of clock cycles required by the compression modules, i.e. Block Error module and the Context module. Each block requires 4096 clock cycles to find the prediction error for one scan path. The basic
scan paths {C, D, O, S} including {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are exhausted to find the
minimum prediction error, processing 4 blocks in parallel. For the Context
module, 4 bytes are transferred in parallel on the 32 bit data path to achieve
parallelism in processing.

Table 3-4. Clock Cycles for Compression Module

Module
Block Error Module
Context Module

Number of clock cycles
131072
4096

The results of image compression using the SCAN-SP simulator are
presented in Table.3-5 for the four test images.

Table 3-5. Compression Ratio
Original
Image

Compressed
Image

Compression
Ratio

1.88145
Lena
2.49032
Camera Man
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1.70329
Mandrill

3.18109
San Simeon castle

Table.3-6. provides the number of clock cycles required for the Encryption module and Decryption module. The size of the images considered is
128x128 bytes of 8 bit depth. These images are partitioned into blocks of size
64x64 which are encrypted in parallel using the same encryption key. Further
iterations will require a multiple of the number of clock cycles required for one
round of encryption. Four image bytes are encrypted in parallel in one clock
cycle.

Table 3-6. Clock Cycles for Encryption/Decryption Module

Module
Encrypt Module
Decrypt Module

Number of clock cycles
4096
4096

The results of image encryption using the SCAN-SP simulator are presented in Table.3-7 for the same test images, with different keys. The output of
the encryption is complete noise with a flat histogram which is in no way related to the input images.

Table 3-7. Encrypted Images
Original Image

Encrypted Image

Lena
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Camera Man

Mandrill

San Simeon castle

The number of clock cycles required for information hiding depends on
the size of the message and the complexity matrix of the cover image. The maximum coprocessor memory to accommodate all the results of the intermediate
operations is 1024KB, which include the intermediate results of compression,
encryption and information hiding. A tightly coupled hardware and software
architecture is essential for the operation of the FPGA based coprocessor presented in this chapter. Recursive and time consuming operations are implemented in reconfigurable logic while software and control signals play an important role in synchronizing the FPGA coprocessor with the processor system.
One time operations, such as Arithmetic coding during image compression, are
implemented in software as they do not present a huge computational overhead. Fig.3-12 depicts the way in which information hiding is implemented using the user specified SCAN keys. The message is embedded in the cover image. The cover image with the embedded message does not visually differ from
the original cover image.
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Fig. 3-12. Information Hiding

3.3.6 Instruction and Data Encryption and Decryption
In this section a methodology to encrypt and decrypt instructions and
data using SCAN methodology is presented. The external memory is assumed
to be insecure. All instructions and data in the external memory are encrypted
using the user specified SCAN key and the XOR key. Plain XOR method on
correlated data such as instruction stream is ineffective; therefore we use the
XOR method in combination with SCAN methodology to strengthen the encryption process. The on chip cache contains the instructions and data in the
encrypted form. The instruction and data is decrypted just before it is decoded
and executed. The instructions and data are decrypted using the same keys.
The architecture of the SCAN-SP is as shown in Fig.3-13.
In the architecture shown in Fig.3-13, two new registers are introduced
to store the two encryption keys. The SCAN key register holds SCAN encryption key and the XOR key register holds the XOR key, which is the value to be
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XORed with the instruction to enable encryption or decryption. A Secure Scratchpad Memory is introduced to hold the intermediate results of any operation.
The on chip secure scratchpad memory is not encrypted. Three on chip random
number generators are introduced for encryption. These three random number
generators have three 8 bit registers to hold the three seed values, which are
accessible using special instructions. As seen in Fig.3-14, the SCAN encryption
and decryption unit sits in between the cache and the CPU core. The instructions and data are decrypted just before they are decoded by the CPU and encrypted just before they are stored on the on-chip cache. Thus the encryption
and decryption unit is implemented as a pipeline stage in the proposed SCANSP architecture.
The SparcV8 is a RISC architecture where all the instructions are 32 bits
in size. SCAN patterns are used to rearrange the bits in the instructions as
shown in Fig.3-15. As an example the SCAN key B5 (e0 z0) is shown. Similarly
different keys can be used.
Simply scrambling the instruction in this manner is not safe because, by
using statistical analysis; it is possible to observe the code execution sequence
to determine where the branch instructions are, and subsequently, everything
else. Therefore, this 32 bit, bit-rearranged instruction is further split into 4 bytes
(8 bits each). These 4 bytes are further encrypted thrice using the SCAN encryption based on three random seeds as shown in Fig.3-16. The SCAN encrypted instruction is further XORed with a user given 32 bit XOR key to further increase the randomness and strength of encryption.
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CU
– Control Unit, ALU – Arithmetic Logic Unit, GPR – General Purpose
Registers, SPR – Special Purpose Registers, MMU –
Memory Management
Unit, S1, S2, S3 – 3 Seeds for Random Number Generators
Fig. 3-13. SCAN-SP Architecture

CU
– Control Unit, ALU – Arithmetic Logic Unit, GPR – General Purpose
Registers, SPR – Special Purpose Registers, MMU –
Memory Management
Unit, S1, S2, S3 – 3 Seeds for Random Number Generators
Fig. 3-14. SCAN-SP Encryption/Decryption Unit
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Fig. 3-15. SCAN Bit Rearrangement of Instructions and Data

Fig. 3-16. Instruction and Data Encryption Block (Pixel Value Substitution)

The SCAN encryption and decryption can be hardwired in the processor architecture or it can be implemented in a microcode ROM. By hardwiring,
the SCAN encryption or decryption can be implemented in seven clock cycles
using multiplexers for bit rearrangement and on-chip random number generators for encryption. It is to be noted that the triple encryption using random
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number generators will take exactly six clock cycles in the pipelined version of
encryption. The bit rearrangement takes one clock cycle. Therefore the SCAN
encryption takes extra seven clock cycles for each instruction.
Further encryption using the XOR key requires one more additional
clock cycle. Therefore a total of extra 8 cycle latency is created per instruction
by implementing the secure SCAN execution mode. The decryption also requires the same amount of extra clock cycles per instruction. This 8 cycle latency is not visible in the pipelined execution of instructions, but is apparent in
case of successful branching in the program execution. This is because the pipeline is flushed and it has to be filled with new instruction originating from the
branched location. Therefore every time the program execution branches, there
has to be an account for the 8 cycle latency to calculate the total number of
clock cycles required for execution of entire encrypted program.

3.3.7 Performance Analysis
Control-transfer instructions (CTIs) include PC-relative branches and
calls, register-indirect jumps, and conditional traps. Most of the control-transfer
instructions are delayed control-transfer instructions (DCTIs), where the instruction immediately following the DCTI is executed before the control transfer to the target address is completed. The instruction following a delayed control-transfer instruction is called a delay instruction. The delay instruction is
always fetched, even if the delayed control transfer is an unconditional branch.
However, a bit in the delayed control transfer instruction can cause the delay
instruction to be annulled (that is, to have no effect) if the branch is not taken
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(or in the branch always case, if the branch is taken). When a delay instruction
is itself a control-transfer instruction, the pair of instructions is referred to as a
delayed control-transfer instruction couple [37].
The total number of Control Transfer Instructions is given by the sum of
the total number of branches, jumps, calls, traps and returns. Of these CTIs,
some of them will not be successful while some CTIs will result in branching
and hence results in flushing of the pipeline.
To analyze the performance of the proposed processor architecture, we
execute Simulated Benchmark Programs (SBP) containing commonly used operations, on the SCAN-SP simulator and observe the CTIs in the program execution. The SBPs contain a random mixture of integer multiplication, integer
division, quick sort and integer matrix multiplication operations. These operations are implemented as function calls and called randomly depending upon
the result of a random number generator. The integers used in these operations
are also generated using random number generators.
Cycle accurate simulation was achieved by modifying the SparcV8
model provided by the ArchC team. All these operations are implemented as C
programs which are converted to executables of Executable Linkable Format
(ELF) and executed on the modified SparcV8 architecture, i.e. SCAN-SP simulator. Table.3-8 gives the number of individual operations in the SBPs.
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Table 3-8. Number of Individual Operations in each Simulated Benchmark Program

Program

# Multiplications

# Divisions

#Quick Sort
(100 Elements)

# 3x3 Matrix
Multiplications

SBP1
SBP2
SBP3
SBP4
SBP5
SBP6
SBP7
SBP8
SBP9
SBP10
SBP11
SBP12
SBP13

14
26
126
251
1248
724
690
1454
0
1483
235
0
0

10
20
113
212
1157
2174
1415
4320
0
517
765
0
0

13
25
127
263
1259
1421
2180
2838
500
0
0
1303
402

13
29
134
274
1336
681
715
1388
0
0
0
447
1098

Tables 3-9 and 3-10 provide an analysis and a comparison of the CPI for
the cycle accurate simulation of SCAN encrypted instructions, with normal instruction execution for the Simulated Benchmark Programs. We observe an increase in CPI due to SCAN encryption and decryption of instructions and data.
Fig.3-17 shows the comparison plot of CPI without SCAN encryption and decryption and CPI with SCAN encryption and decryption of instructions for the
considered Simulated Benchmark Programs.

Table 3-9. Clock Cycles per SBP with and without SCAN Encryption

Program

# instructions

SBP1
SBP2
SBP3
SBP4
SBP5
SBP6
SBP7
SBP8
SBP9
SBP10
SBP11

4079898
6121976
29369242
64962024
179318029
408345674
621771804
839867134
139662341
1732607
864483

# total
CTI
442721
663255
3147982
6896328
18851716
43059954
64890785
88076987
14570475
313649
159275

# CTI
384354
576111
2748291
6051803
16628124
37949442
57511107
77843304
12919099
204357
103724
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# cycles without SCAN
5800245
8702970
41828168
92694387
256331712
583749390
890671742
1201829790
200107997
1961229
977540

# cycles
with SCAN
8875076
13311858
63814489
141108820
389486923
887344950
1350760694
1824576074
303460709
3596085
1807333

SBP12
SBP13

369307028
98579852

38571021
10396948

34172457
9141708

528962714
140759139

802342416
213892846

Table 3-10. CPI with and without SCAN Encryption

Program
SBP1
SBP2
SBP3
SBP4
SBP5
SBP6
SBP7
SBP8
SBP9
SBP10
SBP11
SBP12
SBP13

CPI without SCAN
1.421664
1.421595
1.424217
1.426901
1.429481
1.429547
1.432474
1.430976
1.432799
1.131953
1.130780
1.432312
1.427869

CPI with SCAN
2.175318
2.174438
2.172834
2.172174
2.171319
2.173024
2.172438
2.172458
2.172817
2.075534
2.090651
2.172562
2.169742

Fig. 3-17. CPI plot with and without SCAN Encryption from Table 3-3

Table.3-11 provides the analysis of the relationship between the number
of successful branches and the total number of instructions, resulting in the increase of CPI due to execution of SCAN encrypted instructions in the SBPs. It is
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to be noted that as the ratio of the number of successful branches to the total
number of instructions executed increases, the CPI for program execution with
SCAN encryption also increases. We also observe that the percentage increase
in CPI due to SCAN encryption varies as we vary the probability of each operation being executed. Fig.3-17. is the graphical depiction of Table.3-11.

Table 3-11. Percentage increase in CPI due to SCAN Encryption

Program
SBP1
SBP2
SBP3
SBP4
SBP5
SBP6
SBP7
SBP8
SBP9
SBP10
SBP11
SBP12
SBP13

# CTIs executed / total # instructions
0.094207
0.094105
0.093577
0.093159
0.09273
0.0929346
0.092495521
0.09268526
0.09250238
0.117947694
0.119983852
0.092531294
0.092734041

% increase in CPI due to
SCAN
53.0121 %
52.95763 %
52.56341 %
52.23018 %
51.89562 %
52.007849 %
51.656395 %
51.816518 %
51.648502 %
83.358740 %
84.885747 %
51.682217 %
51.956610 %

The median of the percentage increase in CPI due to SCAN encryption
is around 52%, as seen in Table.3-11, we can conclude that executing regular
applications on SCAN-SP results in a performance degradation in speed of execution to the amount of 52%. Regular applications usually contain a combination of multiplications, divisions, additions, subtractions, register operations
and memory accesses as seen in the SBPs considered above. Thus the proposed
secure feature for the SCAN-SP comes at the cost of reduced speed of execution, which is a necessary trade off considering the increased security. Also it is
worth mentioning that better branch prediction schemes will reduce the laten56

cy imposed by SCAN encryption and decryption.
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Fig. 3-18. Plot of % increase in CPI in SBP due to SCAN encryption to the ratio of number of CTIs executed / total number of instructions executed

The drawback of encrypting instructions is that additional cycles are
needed to decrypt these encrypted instructions before execution and thus an
increase in CPI is experienced. Therefore it is to be noted that the secure computing feature based on the SCAN encryption methodology comes at a cost of
increased CPI. The formula for calculating the CPI for the execution of SCAN
encrypted instructions is given by:
Total Cycles without SCAN Encryption of Instructions + (Number of CTIs Executed)*8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total number of Instructions

The percentage increase in CPI for the execution of SCAN encrypted in57

structions as compared to the execution of normal instructions is given by:
(CPI with SCAN Encryption of Instructions – CPI with Normal Instructions)

X 100

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CPI with Normal Instructions

To enable accessing the SCAN key register, the XOR key register and to
load the seeds for the random number generators, compiler support is needed
along with new instructions which are explained in detail in the next section.

3.3.8 Instructions to Access Special Registers
In order to support the above architecture for 32 bit instruction and data
encryption and decryption, seven new instructions are introduced. These instructions are not encrypted and are executed in a secure or trusted environment. The instructions are explained below.
secure_load – The secure load (secure_load) instruction is executed in its
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction implies the beginning of the code block in which the SCAN key register, random number generator seed registers and the XOR key register are accessed. When this instruction is executed, the previous contents of the SCAN key register, XOR key
register, I-cache, D-cache, GPR, SPR, ALU, MMU and the Secure Scratchpad
Memory are erased. The instructions following this command are not encrypted.
load_scan_key – The load SCAN key (load_scan_key) instruction is executed in its non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is
followed by the SCAN key which is loaded into the SCAN key register.
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load_xor_key – The load XOR key (load_xor_key) instruction is executed
in its non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is followed
by the 32 bit XOR key which is loaded into the XOR key register.
load_seed1 – The load Seed 1 (load_seed1) instruction is executed in its
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is followed by
the 8 bit seed stored in an on-chip register required by the first on-chip random
number generator.
load_seed2 – The load Seed 2 (load_seed2) instruction is executed in its
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is followed by
the 8 bit seed stored in an on-chip register required by the second on-chip random number generator.
load_seed3 – The load Seed 3 (load_seed3) instruction is executed in its
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is followed by
the 8 bit seed stored in an on-chip register required by the third on-chip random number generator.
secure_lock – The secure lock (secure_lock) instruction is executed in its
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction implies the ending of the code block in which the SCAN key register and the XOR key register
are programmed. All instructions following this command are encrypted.
Access to SCAN key register and the XOR key register is not possible after this
command.
The loading of the SCAN key register, the XOR key register and the
seeds for the random number generators is done as shown in Fig.3-19. The in59

structions following the secure_lock command are encrypted using the SCAN
methodology and XOR key before they are stored in the memory. This requires
compiler and hardware to support the encryption of instructions and data before storing in memory.

Fig. 3-19. Loading of Encryption and Decryption Keys

3.4

Conclusion
In the previous sections we presented the architecture of the SCAN se-

cure processor which is a modified SparcV8 architecture. We presented an instruction set to implement SCAN methodology based algorithms for image
compression, encryption and information hiding, implemented on an off-chip
FPGA co-processor. We presented the XILINX ISE synthesis results of the
FPGA co- processor for the SCAN based compression, encryption and information hiding. We also described a SCAN based methodology for encryption and
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decryption of instructions and data along with the results of cycle accurate simulation using the ArchC model for SparcV8 processor.
We see that we require a seamless integration of hardware and software
for optimum performance of the processor. The throughput of the system can
further be increased by transferring 4 bytes at a time on the 32 bit wide bus
along with using an edge triggered RAM for storing and retrieving data. We
further note that we are not only limited to processing images using the SCAN
based methodology, but we can also extend the methodology to process voice,
text and other types of data by converting these types of data to 2-D and treating them as images. We can use zero padding on the data to achieve a 2nx2n
size in case the data cannot be converted into a square matrix before processing
it with the SCAN algorithms.
However, the ultimate goal of this work is a detailed study of the tradeoffs that exist between speed of execution and processor security. There may
be applications where speed of execution is of prime importance and there may
also be applications where secure execution is of importance. Therefore, design
methodology is always application specific and cannot be generalized. Further
work in this direction will be the VLSI implementation of the coprocessor subsystem that will have increased throughput and a higher clock rate.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Biometrics is the study of methods for uniquely identifying or authenti-

cating humans based on intrinsic physical or behavioral traits. Identification
means characteristics are selected from a database, to produce a list of possible
or likely matches. Authentication means that when a person makes a claim that
he or she is that specific person, just that specific person‟s characteristics are
being checked to see if they match. The two important operations in a biometric system are enrollment and test. During enrollment the biometric of the individual is stored as a database, and during test the biometric information of the
individual is detected and compared with the stored database. Various biometric techniques are currently used, as shown in Fig.4-1.

Fig. 4-1. Examples of Biometric Characteristics [87]

In this chapter, we select representative works on neural networks that
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describe biometric based methodologies on voice, iris, finger, palm, and face.
We do not cover all the work done in the field of neural nets based biometrics,
but we select a small set of NN-based methods from different forms of biometrics in order to capture the evolution of some of the most representative neural
networks based methods. The objective is to provide to the readers the general
idea behind neural nets based biometrics and their future [62-87].

4.1

Voice Biometric
Voice based authentication methodologies are the easiest to implement

since they do not need a considerable amount of investment on hardware. Existing hardware can be used along with required software to implement a voice
based identification system. This section contains the review of representative
works that describe voice based identity verification systems.

4.1.1 Speaker Verification by means of ANNs
The two general approaches to speaker verification are text-dependent
and text- independent. In a text dependent speaker verification system, a predefined utterance by the user is used for training the system and testing/using
it. In text-independent speaker verification, the text to be uttered is not prescribed. Effectively, language does not matter. Reference and test signals are
required to have identical wording. Intra-speaker variations are induced by
emotional state of the speaker, health and aging whereas inter-speaker variations are caused by different speaking habits such as rhythm and intonation or
dialects.
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Prior to comparison of the reference and test speech, some kind of time
alignment has to be performed between the two. This aligning of speech signals can be done by dynamic time warping (DTW). Once this alignment is
done, corresponding frames of the test and reference signals can be directly
compared to each other. For each pair consisting of a test and reference signal,
a distance called local distance is computed. The global distance is then computed by averaging the local distances over the length of the signal.
In this work [62], Artificial Neural Network (ANN) based distance
measure for the discrimination task is investigated. The test and reference
speech signals are time aligned with the DTW algorithm that uses Euclidean
cepstral distance as optimization criterion. For each frame of the aligned signals, features are extracted. These extracted features are then fed to the ANN,
which yields a local distance for this pair of frames. These local distances are
weighted and averaged over time to obtain the global distance, which is compared to a pre determined threshold for classification.
The ANN used in this study is a fully connected multi-layer perceptron
with hyperbolic tangent activation function. For training, back propagation algorithm is used along with the adaptive learning rate. Since the feature vector
has 24 cepstral coefficients, we need 24 input nodes and 1 output node. Two
hidden layers having 60 nodes in the first and 18 in the second produced optimal results. The calculated distances should be the same even if the reference
and test feature vectors are interchanged. This invariance was built using the
absolute difference between the feature vectors. Linear transformation is used
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to normalize the data in order to have zero mean and diagonal co-variance matrixes.
Further transitional information using the first and second derivatives
of the cepstrum coefficients was fed to the ANN along with the cepstrum coefficients. For this purpose, the number of input nodes had to be tripled. Though
this increased the fisher ratio for local distances, the global distances were distorted leading to poor performance. To overcome this issue, the authors propose the use of parallel ANN. To the first ANN, only the cepstrum coefficients
are presented, to the second ANN, the first derivatives of the cepstrum coefficients are presented and to the third, the second derivatives of the cepstrum
coefficients are presented. Though the cepstrum coefficients or instantaneous
features bear more information, the combination of their derivatives along with
the cepstrum coefficients provide useful results.
The test set considered here is 30 male speakers. Some 10 sessions per
speaker were recorded within a time frame of several months using different
telephones. The total duration of the collected speech is about 3 hours and the
LPC cepstrum coefficients were extracted from 37.5 ms long speech frames
with a frame shift of 15ms. The ANNs were trained with some 500,000 feature
pairs from 20 speakers and tested with the remaining 10 speakers along with
the 20 speakers.
The authors claim that the above presented method showed good generalization and is virtually speaker independent. They further claim that new
speakers do not require a retraining of the ANNs. But further details on how
65

generalization is achieved, are not provided. Also the training set used is very
small and if thousands of users are involved, generalization may not hold
good.

4.1.2 Speaker Specific Mapping for Text Independent Speaker
Recognition
In this work [63], the authors propose a mapping approach for the task
of text-independent speaker recognition. The mapping property of a multi
layer feed forward neural network (MLFFNN) is used to generate a model for
each speaker. In the mapping approach, speaker specific information is captured by mapping a set of parameter vectors specific to linguistic information
in the speech to a set of parameter vectors having linguistic and speaker information.
Linear prediction coding derived cepstral coefficients are used to derive
suitable vectors for mapping approach. LP analysis is used to obtain clues
about parameters that contain predominantly linguistic information or linguistic and speaker information. After selecting the parameter vectors suitable for
mapping, the next task is to derive the mapping function itself. The non-linear
speaker specific mapping function can be captured using the MLFFNN, where
the mean squared error is minimized using a gradient descent algorithm.
For testing, the input parameter vector is presented to each MLFFNN
and the difference between the desired output vector and the actual output
vector of the MLFFNN is used as a distance for that frame. The total accumulated distance is then averaged over all test frames to give an indication of the
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proximity of test utterance.
Euclidean distance between the output of the network and the desired
output parameter vector was used for evaluating the performance of a speaker
model relative to the models of other speakers. A background model (BG) is
generated using the parameter vectors extracted from speech utterances of a
large number of speakers registered with the system. The MLFFNN is trained
with the pooled input and output parameter vectors from all the speakers.
These weights from the BG model are then used to train each speaker model.
This avoids the bias that any arbitrary initial weights may introduce while generating a speaker model. The relative score for the test signal is obtained using
the difference between the average distance for the BG model and the speaker
model. Also, investigation on the frequency content shows that speaker specific
information is available in the higher frequencies.
The authors claim that the proposed mapping approach performs as efficiently as the GMM based approaches for all the 630 speakers in the database.
But the number of free parameters is much less as compared to the Gaussian
Mixture Models based approach.

4.1.3

Neural Network for Improved Text Independent Speaker
Identification
In this work [64], the authors present a neural network array (NNA)

that combines a binary partitioned approach having pattern index information
with decision trees. The authors verify that the NNA can not only reduce the
computation cost of training and recognition, but also reduce the classification
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error. Speaker identification with radial basis function neural network
(RBFNNA) is considered as an application of the NNA. The advantage of using
NNA is that the architecture is expandable when a new entry is added; the
main disadvantage of NNs needing to retain the entire network for the new
catalog is partly overcome by the NNA.
The authors present a fast searching algorithm for distinguishing N catalogs by a cascading a decision and pruning criteria. The subnet is trained by
two catalogs. In recognition stage, a subnet could accept one catalog and reject
the other catalog. If a catalog is accepted we consider that it was similar to the
correct catalog and the other must be incorrect. The search path for the algorithm is from the top row to the bottom row. All the subnets that reject the unknown catalog will be pruned.
The database used consisted of speech utterances from 20 Chinese male
post graduate students under normal lab conditions. The speech signal was
sampled at 8 kHz with 16 bits ADC. Sixteen orders of linear predictive cepstral
coefficients (LPCC) of each frame is adopted as the speaker‟s features. The
frames consist of 256 sample points with 128 overlapping sample points.
The authors use the RBFNN because it has the same underlying structure of the Gaussian mixture models usually used in similar applications and
also because the RBFNNs have efficient training algorithms where the number
of nodes in the hidden layer can be automatically determined by orthogonal
least squares. The number of nodes in the first layer is 16, in the output layer it
is 1, and in the hidden layer it is automatically determined.
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The authors conclude that the larger the number of speakers, the higher
the error rate for identification. To reduce the error rate, additional information
of the catalog index can be used. Although NNA could deal with any classifying problem, its application for speaker identification is limited. The authors
conclude that, additionally, the NNAs are more suitable for difficult tasks like
automatic classification of EEG or biomedical signals where the signals are corrupted to a higher degree.

4.1.4 Speaker Identification Using Neural Networks and Wavelets
This work [65] presents an offline system that uses wavelets to generate
multi-resolution time frequency features that characterize the speech waveform
to successfully identify a speaker in the presence of competing speakers. The
authors say that this system is successful for short utterances and has also been
applied to inter-speaker speech recognition.
The “cocktail party” effect describes the phenomenon in which humans
can selectively focus attention to one sound source among competing sound
sources. For the hearing impaired, the ability to achieve this effect is somewhat
more difficult, as amplifying sound also translates into amplifying noise, which
conventional hearing aids normally do. The primary objective of this research
relates to noise in the ambient listening environment, such as with competing
speakers. Therefore, before the signal processing can be applied to the sound
signal arriving at the user‟s ears, a method must be first developed to differentiate speech and noise, i.e. the noise is speech from a competing speaker.
The phonemes of speech encompass a wide variety of characteristics, in
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both time and frequency domains. Frequency analysis using fixed time window techniques such as the short time Fourier Transforms are fixed window
resolution operators in which the time duration of the analysis is inversely
proportional to the bandwidth of the filters, meaning that high frequency localization results in poor time resolution and vice versa.
The multi-resolution analysis of speech models the cochlear mechanism
of spectral decomposition during the initial stage of sound transduction,
wherein a time varying signal is spatially distributed in patterns along the basilar membrane. It has been shown that the nervous system processes spatially
distributed patterns more efficiently than varying temporal signals.
The original speech waveform sampled at 8 kHz is convolved with the
high pass and low pass Quadrature Mirror Filters. The resulting convolution
co-efficients are sub-sampled or decimated by a factor of two and they
represent the co-efficients for that octave. Once the time–frequency features
have been obtained for the various speech waveforms, the objective is to use
these features in a pattern recognition scheme and in a manner that avoids the
undesirability of the local convergence. The ALOPEX – Algorithms of Pattern
Extraction – is a method developed to effectively find the global maxima and
minima without local convergence, in a manner that does not require inefficient scanning.
Three male and three females, including those with American, Chinese,
and European accents, were used as subjects. Subjects were asked to speak into
a unidirectional microphone, leaving about 1 cm gap between the mouth and
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the microphone. The sampling rate and analog-to-digital conversion resolution
were 8 kHz at 8 bits, respectively. Each speaker was asked to articulate a series
of 10 words, three times each.
After the input speech is pre-processed, it is made available to the
wavelet transform. The signal detail co-efficients, which are time frequency features, are generated for four octaves. Each octave has 64 bins spanning 896
msec. Signals shorter than 896 msec are padded to that duration. The wavelet
transform consists of convolutions of quadrature mirror filters. Because linear
convolution is inefficient, a frequency based convolution was implemented. A
problem with frequency based convolution is that FFT processes the input signal as if it is periodic, therefore resulting in side lobe artifacts. Also memory
overhead is high to process the entire length of the waveform at one time. To
circumvent these limitations, an overlapping windowing technique is used, in
which the sampled waveform is processed in windows of 256 bytes with overlaps of 32 bytes, in which each 8-bit sample is stored in a byte.
Before the next window is processed, the resulting wavelet co-efficients
for the current window are swapped to a disk. The current window that is read
is processed entirely, but not all of the co-efficients are written to the disk, as
the co-efficients closest to the boundary contain the artifacts associated with the
FFT. The co-efficients from the next window overwrite the artifact area of the
previous window. The overlap values are determined as a ratio of windows
overlapping each other by a factor of 1/8. As described above, the mean values
of the co-efficients are taken for a window subdivided by two. To calculate the
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time resolution that these subdivisions represent, the actual size of the window
is truncated by the overlap of the preceding window. In this case, we have a 32
bit overlap for the signal. These co-efficients are mapped to a 256 parameter
vector and the ANN consists of 256 input nodes.
The cocktail party effect was simulated by digital mixing with the input
waveform from another speaker. Tests were also conducted with input waveforms corrupted with -20 dB white noise. Training data were not used as testing data. Three methods of pattern recognition were implemented: ALOPEX
template matching method, artificial neural network method using ALOPEX
training algorithm, and artificial neural network using a back propagation
learning algorithm. The neural network topology used in each neural network
implementation consisted of 256 nodes in the input, 10 nodes in the hidden
layer, and three nodes in the output layer. Each node of the output layer
represents one of the three templates (speakers). For the NN topology, the
ALOPEX method showed better convergence as compared to the back propagation method.
Due to computational overhead, the implementation of the cocktail party pre-processor into a digital hearing aid is presently unlikely. However, a
feasible method of speaker identification in the presence of competing noise
has been demonstrated, which is a complication that all speaker-and-speech
recognition systems are susceptible to.

4.2

Iris Scan Biometric
Iris recognition is a method of biometric authentication that uses pat72

tern recognition techniques based on high-resolution images of the iris of the
individual's eyes. Iris scan based security systems offer robust and reliable authentication as compared to other biometric methodologies. In this section, we
review representative works describing iris scan systems for identity authentication.

4.2.1 Fast Iris Detection for Personal Verification Using Modular Neural
Nets
The author presents the application of fast and co-operative modular
neural nets (MNN) to automatically identify human irises in a given image
[66]. Image acquisition of the irises cannot be expected to yield an image containing only the irises. Therefore, prior to iris pattern matching, it is important
to localize the portion of the acquired image corresponding to the iris. The
work also aims to solve the problem of requiring large databases to build an
automatic system in order to detect the location of the irises in the acquired image.
The MNN proposed in this work attempts to reduce the effects of over
learning or under learning capabilities of the NN by using a divide and conquer approach, where large tasks are decomposed into smaller subtasks, each
handled by a fast, simple, and efficient module. A fast searching algorithm for
iris detection that reduces the computational complexity of the NNs is presented.
In the initial proposed algorithm, the first step is histogram equalization
of the acquired image. Then, the classifier receives an input of 20x20 pixel re73

gion of the gray scale image and generates an output region ranging from -1 to
1, signifying the presence or absence of an iris respectively. The classifier is applied at every pixel position in the input image. To achieve rotation invariance,
the NN is trained for images rotated from 0 degrees to 355 degrees by a step of
5 degrees. To detect irises in a larger window size, the input image is repeatedly reduced in size. Thus, the classification has some invariance to rotation,
translation, and scaling.
To enhance the detection decision, the detection results of the neighboring windows are used to confirm the decision at a given location. This will reduce the false detection as neighboring windows may reveal non-iris characteristics of the data. A threshold on the number of neighboring windows can be
used for this task. Images in the databases were divided into three groups,
which resulted in three NNs. Each group consisted of 400 patters (200 irises
and 200 non irises). Each group is used to train one neural network. Each network consists of 13 hidden neurons. The output layer consists of only one neuron. Using the enhanced detection, the author claims up to 96% detection rate.
The author also presents a fast algorithm using 2D cross correlation
technique between the reference and the input images in a sliding window.
This window is represented by the neural nets weights situated between the
input unit and the hidden layer. The author proposes the use of Fast Fourier
Transforms to speed up the calculation of the cross-correlation results.
The author also proposes image normalization in the frequency space
by normalizing the weights in the neural network. As compared to time do74

main normalization, which requires (N-n+1)2n2 operations, the proposed frequency domain normalization requires 2n2 operations, where NxN is the image
size and nxn is the sliding window size.
The theoretical speedup factor K obtained is:
K = [q(N-n+1) 2n2] / [(q+1)N2 log2N2 + qN2]
The images were tested for the presence of iris at different scales by
building a pyramid of the input image, which generates a set of images at different resolutions. The iris detector is applied at each resolution and this
process takes much more time. To overcome this, in Fourier space, the new
scales need not be computed. This is because if f(x,y) is the original image and
g(x,y) is the sub sampled image by a factor of 2, then
g(x,y) = FT(2x, 2y)
The author further investigates the number of computation steps required by the neural nets on varying image sizes. It is found that as the size of
the image increases, the number of computations do not increase linearly; .i.e.,
the number of computations for a 100x100 image is far greater as compared to a
50x50 image. To overcome this disadvantage, the author proposes decomposing the image into sub images and then testing these sub images separately.
Further improvement can be achieved by using parallel processors on these
sub images. Thus the speedup ratio increases and the running time decreases.
The author claims that the simulation results show that the proposed
algorithm is an efficient method for finding locations of irises when the size of
the iris is unknown, as well as rotated, scaled, occluded, noised, and mirrored
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irises are detected correctly at different illumination levels. The proposed method is also suitable for detecting the presence or absence of any other object in
an image.

4.2.2 Iris Recognition by a Rotation Spreading Neural Network
The authors present a rotation spreading neural network (R-SAN net)
[67] [68]. This neural net can recognize the orientation of an object irrespective
of its shape and its shape irrespective of its orientation. Thus, it is suitable for
shape and orientation recognition of a concentric circular pattern because it
uses polar conversion. The authors propose to experiment with R-SAN net to
simultaneously recognize the orientation and shape of the iris images of people
who have had their irises registered.
The input pattern of 300x300 pixels is transformed to polar co-ordinates.
This transformed pattern is input into the spreading layer and the spread pattern is obtained. In the learning stage, the memory matrix of the orientation
and shape are obtained by generalized inverse learning. The number of learning patterns is the product of the number of learning shapes and the number of
learning orientations.
The spread image corresponding to the respective spreading weight is
obtained by multiplication of the transformed image with the spreading weight
which is the periodic Gaussian curve function predetermined at equal intervals
in various directions. The spread image is summed in each direction and combined to produce the spread pattern vector. A population vector is created to
indicate the orientation of the object.
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In the recollection stage, the output of orientation recognition neurons
is obtained by multiplying the spread pattern and orientation memory matrix,
and the output of shape recognition neurons is obtained by the spread pattern
and shape memory matrix.
The recognition experiments were performed in 3 sessions; the number
of subjects was 3, 5, and 10, respectively. For each subject six iris patterns
oriented at six orientations were generated from one iris image and these were
used for learning the R-SAN net. The pupil position was detected using a partial eye template for the eye image taken by a compact close up camera. The
authors conclude that iris recognition is possible in any arbitrary orientation
without depending on zoom of the camera. In an experiment with un-learned
test iris patterns, the R-SAN net combined with minimum distance as the shape
recognition criterion, perfectly rejected the unregistered iris patterns.

4.3

Fingerprint Biometric
Fingerprint identification is the process of comparing given and known

skin ridge impressions from fingers to determine if the impressions are from
the same finger, thus identifying or verifying the owner of the given fingerprint. In this section we review representative works describing fingerprint
biometric, which is by far the most commonly used biometric.
4.3.1

Fingerprints Classification Using ANNs: A Combined Structural
and Statistical Approach
This work [69] describes a fingerprint classification algorithm using

Multilayer Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). A method for coarse level classi77

fication of the fingerprint images by combining both the structural features and
statistical measure of fingerprint patterns is introduced. Fingerprints are classified into six categories: arches, tented arches, left loops, right loops, whorls,
and twin loops.
After preprocessing and normalization of the fingerprint image, its block directional image is calculated and is used to extract both statistical and structural features
required for classification. The classification algorithm consists of four major steps:


Compute the block directional image



Extract the structural features of the pattern



Compute the statistical measures of the pattern



Design a multilayer ANN composed of six subnet works for the six fingerprint
classes and use a multivariate input vector, which is a combination of the structural
features and statistical measures
In the first step of calculating the block directional image, the fingerprint image

is divided into a number of squares and the local orientation is computed in these
squares. Later on the spurious directions in the block directional image are smoothened.
A set of horizontal and vertical operators are used iteratively for the smoothening purpose. These block directions of the directional image are converted into binary blocks
so that the resultant curves can be traced using a line tracing algorithm.
The transformed block directional image is composed of ones, which act as a
link between various curves of the pattern. The pattern is scanned from left to right, and
top to bottom by using a set of feature masks. Each mask is assigned a symbol and each
connected curve consists of a string of symbols that represent the curve without any
loss of information. The alphabetic symbols used to represent the curve strings are then
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transformed to map an input vector to the ANN. Every symbol is transformed to a binary string.
Method of moments is used to extract the statistical features for a fingerprint
from its characteristic string, which can be described using a second moment. The Euclidean distance measure is used to measure the distance between the second moment of
the unknown pattern and mean second moment of each class. A three layer feed forward ANN which has six sub networks (one for each class) is used. The input layer has
180 independent variables of the binary string and six Euclidean distances; i.e. a total
of 186 elements. Each subnet is trained independently on its data set by using error
back propagation learning.
The database used was the Egyptian Criminal Evidence Fingerprint database,
which contains 30,000 fingerprints of which 1500 fingerprints of good quality were
selected. Each subnet was trained on 100 patterns, which carries the characteristics of
its class. The authors claim that, in a six class problem the network achieved 95% classification accuracy, and in a four class problem where whorls and twin loops together
formed one category, the classification accuracy was 99%.

4.3.2 Fingerprint Classification by Directional Image Partitioning
In this work [70], the authors present a new fingerprint classification
method that uses dynamic masks for directional image partitioning. The authors claim that this approach is translation and rotation invariant and does not
require the singularities to be detected. The directional image is a discrete matrix whose elements represent the local average directions of the fingerprint
ridge lines, which summarizes the information contained in the fingerprint pattern. It is reliable even in the presence of noise and damaged areas. A compact
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version of the directional image by grouping similar elements into “homogeneous” regions is generated, thus eliminating redundancy and giving useful
synthetic representation that can be exploited for the classification task.
The authors conduct a literature review on:


Syntactic methods, where patterns are described by means of terminal
symbols and production rules.



Approaches based on singularities, where heuristics criteria based on the
number and position of the singularities are important for classification.



Neural approaches, where multilayer perceptrons or Kohonen self organizing networks are used.



Other methods based on geometrical shape, curve fitting and hidden Markov model classifier.



PCASYS approach by NIST, where the feature extraction is done using
principal component analysis and classification is done by using a probabilistic neural network.



A structural approach based on relational graphs, where dynamic clustering algorithms are used to segment the image processed with directional
masks to create homogenous regions, thus building a relational graph.
In the new approach, the authors propose a guided segmentation of the

directional image with the aim of reducing the degrees of freedom during the
partitioning process. To achieve this, a set of dynamic masks directly derived
from the most common fingerprint classes are used to guide the partitioning.
Initially, averaging is done using a 3x3 window to smoothen the image
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and later on the singularities are strengthened. This image is then partitioned
using dynamic masks. Dynamic masks are characterized by a set of vertices
defining the borders of the regions that determine the segmentation. The creation of prototype masks is thus completed. For each possible fingerprint pattern, at least one well fitting dynamic mask is created. Therefore, the masks are
derived from the classes of a well known classifier.
The authors define two methodologies for fingerprint retrieval. The first
methodology assumes an error free classification, so the search is restricted to
the database fingerprints resembling analogous classification characteristics.
The second methodology allows for misclassification to be taken into consideration and the search is carried out incrementally over the whole database. This
method requires that a human expert terminates the search. For experiments,
the authors used two databases:


Db4: contains 2,000 fingerprints, uniformly distributed in five classes



Db14: contains 27,000 fingerprint pairs randomly taken
The authors conclude that the proposed method is suitable for both

continuous classification where each fingerprint is characterized with a numerical vector, whose components denote the similarity degree with respect to a
predefined set of class prototypes, as well as exclusive classification techniques
where fingerprints are partitioned into some predefined classes according to
their macro-features.

4.4

Palm Print Biometric
Palm print recognition implements many of the same matching charac81

teristics of fingerprint recognition. Palm biometrics is represented by the information presented in a friction ridge impression. This information combines
ridge flow, ridge characteristics, and ridge structure of the raised portion of the
epidermis. The data represented by these impressions allows identification or
authentication of individuals by comparing with a database. In this section, we
review representative works that describe biometric identification based on
palm prints.

4.4.1 Biometric Identification through Hand Geometry Measurements
The authors present a method [71] in defining and implementing a
biometric system based on hand geometry identification. Hand features are
extracted from a color photograph of the user‟s hand. Various pattern recognition techniques are explored for classification and verification. The authors
claim up to 97% success rate in classification.
Hand geometry is appropriate for medium security applications. There
are certain advantages in using hand geometry as listed below:


Medium cost



Low computational cost algorithms



Low template size



Easy and attractive to users, leading to NEARLY null user rejection



Lack of relation to police, justice, and criminal records
The hand geometry identification system presented in this work works

in two phases:


An enrollment phase where several photographs are taken from the user
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and features extracted from them are stored in a central database.


The verification phase where a single photograph is taken, and features extracted from it are compared with the data base.
The comparison phase can be configured in two ways:



As a classifier, where the extracted features are compared with the features
of all the users‟ templates in the database to recognize the user.



As a verifier, where the user states his/her identity and only a particular
sample belonging to that user is compared.
The process starts with the image capture of the user‟s palm. The cap-

tured image is a 640x480 pixels color photograph in JPEG format. The image
also contains a lateral view of the hand due to the placement of a mirror, to be
able to measure heights. This captured color image is then converted to a black
and white image. Any deviations due to hand positioning are then corrected by
resizing or rotating this image. An edge detector, i.e. Sobel function, is applied
to extract the contour of the hand.
In the measurement phase, features based on widths of the four fingers,
the height of the middle finger, little finger, and the palm, inter-finger distances/deviations and inter-finger angles are extracted. To account for weight
loss or gain by the user, all distances are taken relative to a determined measure.
A total of 31 features are extracted; i.e. 21 widths, 3 heights, 4 deviations
and 3 angles. Using the Fisher ratio, redundant features were eliminated, and
the total number of features was reduced to 25.
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For the purpose of classification and verification, the features vectors
are compared against templates in the database. For this purpose four methods
were evaluated:


Euclidean distance: This is the most common approach of all where Euclidean distances between the user‟s feature vectors and the feature vectors in
the database are calculated.



Hamming distance: Based on the assumption that the feature vector distribution follows the Gaussian distribution, hamming distances are calculated
for classification.



Gaussian mixture models (GMM): A simple probability density function is
calculated through training to estimate the probability if a sample belongs
to a class or not.



Radial Basis Functions Neural Networks (RBFNN): A two layer neural
network is trained using the feature vectors from all the users for classification purpose. But if it is to be used for a user verification purpose, each user
has to have his or her own NN, but this NN has to be trained using all the
feature vectors from all the users in the database. This could be against
some restrictions. Therefore, the authors consider only a classification
scheme for the RBFNN.
The database was created using 10 photographs taken over three

months of 20 people of different ages, sex, color, profession and living style.
For enrollment, three to five samples were considered sufficient. Experiments
were carried out for both verification and classification approaches. The au84

thors conclude that in both the approaches, the GMM performed better with
97% of success for classification and an error rate below 10% for verification.
Reducing the feature vectors to nine features leads to great loss in success rate.
The database size used is limited and the authors conclude with a remark on
conducting further work using a larger database with easier implementation
approaches to generalize the results obtained.

4.4.2 Personal Authentication using Palm-Prints Features
In this work [72], the authors propose a scanner based personal authentication system by using the palm print features. The identification process is
composed of two stages: enrollment and verification. In the enrollment stage,
many hand images of an individual are collected and pre-processed for feature
extraction and creation of a template. In the verification stage, the test sample is
also pre-processed for feature extraction and then matched with the templates
to decide whether it is a genuine sample or not.
The pre-processing is done by image thresholding, border tracing,
wavelet based segmentation and ROI location. Sobel and other morphological
operators are used for feature extraction and the reference templates are generated. In verification, template matching along with back-propagation neural
nets is used to measure similarity between the reference and test samples. To
create the feature vectors, the mean values of pixels in the grids are calculated.
These values are sequentially arranged row by row to form the feature vectors.
The authors use three different grid sizes, 32x32, 16x16 and 8x8, to obtain the
multi-resolution feature vectors.
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Template matching using the correlation function is used to perform the
verification task to decide whether the query sample is genuine or not. Also, in
case of neural nets, a three layer based network that includes a hidden and an
output layer is used. There are 80, 40, and 1, neurons in each layer respectively.
To create the database, 30 hand images of each person are obtained
three times within three weeks. In the enrollment stage, the first 10 images are
used to train, and 20 other images are used for verification. Implementation
and coding was done using C and Matlab on a Windows platform. For the
template matching method, the authors report 91% accuracy rate, whereas for
the neural network based method, using the back-propagation and scaled conjugate gradient algorithm, the authors report 98% accuracy.

4.5

Facial Biometric
Face recognition systems work by comparing the acquired facial image

of an individual with a database to identify or authenticate the individual. In
this section we review representative works that describe face recognition systems based on Neural Networks.

4.5.1 Face Recognition with Radial Basis Function (RBF) Neural
Networks
In this work [73], the authors present an efficient design approach for
the Radial Basis Function Neural Networks (RBFNN) classifier to deal with
small training sets of high dimension. The face features are first extracted using
the Principal component analysis (PCA) and then processed with the Fischer
Linear discriminant to lower the dimensionality. The authors also propose a
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hybrid algorithm for training the RBFNNs.
The face recognition problem has the following issues as compared to
any other pattern classification problem:


Over-fitting: If the input dimension for network is comparable to the size of
the training set, it results in poor generalization.



Over-training: High dimension of the network input results in slow convergence.



Small Sample Effect: Small samples can easily contaminate the design and
evaluation of the proposed system.



If the number of training patterns is less than the number of features plus
one, the sample covariance matrix is singular and unusable.
The proposed method tries to solve the above problems and deals with

small training sets of high dimensionality. The proposed method consists of the
following parts:


Reducing the number of input variables: Features are extracted using the
PCA and the dimensionality is reduced using the Fischer‟s linear discriminator.



A new clustering algorithm concerning category information and training
samples: To avoid undesired and highly dominant averaging phenomenon
associated with unsupervised learning algorithms, the authors propose using a supervised clustering algorithm that takes into consideration the category information of the training data.



Two criteria to estimate the width of the RBF to control generalization:
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Majority Criterion: In any class, each datum should have more than
50% confidence level for the class it belongs to.
Overlapping Criterion: The key idea of this approach is to consider not
only the intra-data distribution, but also the inter-data variations.
The number of inputs is made equal to that of features (i.e., the dimension of the input space) and the number of outputs to be equal to that of
classes.


A hybrid learning algorithm to train the RBF: The hybrid algorithm combines the gradient and the linear least squares paradigm to adjust the parameters.
A total of 300 face images from the ORL database were used. The train-

ing set consisted of 10 images for each of the 30 individuals, selected to
represent different poses and expressions. Another 300 images were used as
the testing set. The authors claim that the results demonstrated that the success
rate of recognition is 100%.

4.5.2 A State-of-the-Art Neural Network for Robust Face Verification
In this work [74], the authors propose the use of skin color as an additional feature for robust face verification. This new feature set is tested on a
benchmark database, namely XM2VTS, using a simple discriminant artificial
neural network.
The bounding box for the face is computed using the coordinates of the
located eyes, assuming perfect face detection. The face is then cropped and the
extracted sub-image is downsized to a 30x40 image. After enhancement and
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smoothing, the face then becomes a feature vector of dimension 1200. The skin
color pixels are filtered, from the sub-image corresponding to the extracted
face, using a look-up table of skin color pixels. For better results, the face
bounding box should thus avoid as much hair as possible.
The histograms for RGB pixel components are calculated. These histograms are characteristic to a specific person and also can be used as discriminant among different people. The illumination during image acquisition is controlled. For each color channel, a histogram is built using 32 discrete bins.
Hence, the feature vector produced by the concatenation of the histograms (R,
G, and B) has 96 components.
For verification, the authors choose Multi-layer perceptrons (MLP). For
each client, the MLP is trained to classify the input as the given client or an imposter. The input to the MLP is a feature vector extracted from the face image
with or without skin color. The MLP is trained using both client and imposter
images.
The database used for this purpose is the multi-modal XM2VTS database, and its associated experimental protocol is the Lausanne Protocol. The
XM2VTS database contains synchronized image and speech data recorded on
295 subjects during four sessions taken at one month intervals. On each session, two recordings were made, each consisting of a speech shot and a head
rotation shot. The 295 subjects were divided into a set of 200 clients, 25 evaluation impostors, and 70 test impostors.
For experimenting and comparison, the authors compared an MLP us89

ing 1200 inputs corresponding to the downsized 30x40 gray scale face images
and an MLP using 1296 inputs corresponding to the same face image and skin
color. For each client model the training database consisted of 4 images of the
client and 4 images of the imposter training set. The database was enlarged by
rotating and scaling these images. These training sets were later divided into
three subsets, one for training, one for validation and a third as a test set. A 90
hidden unit MLP was the chosen architecture. The authors conclude that the
results using the skin color information achieve state-of-the art results and
have enhanced performance.

4.5.3 Face Recognition: A Convolution Neural Network Approach
In this work [75], the authors present a hybrid neural network solution.
The system combines local image sampling, a self organizing map neural network, and a convolutional neural network.
The authors present results using the Karhunen-Lo`eve transform in
place of the self organizing map and a multi layer perceptron in place of the
convolutional network. The convolutional network extracts larger features in a
hierarchical set of layers. The authors are interested in face recognition with
varying facial detail, expression, pose, etc., and do not consider invariance to
high degree of scaling or rotation.
Initially, local sampling of the image is done. The authors evaluate two
methods to perform local sampling:


The first method is to create a vector from a local window on the image using intensity values at each point in the window.
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The second method creates a representation of the local sample by forming
a vector out of the intensity of the center pixel and the difference in intensity between the center pixel and all the other pixels within the square window.
A self organizing map (SOM) is trained on the vectors from the pre-

vious stage. The authors also experiment with replacing the SOM with Karhunen-Lo`eve transform. The same window as in the first step is stepped over all
of the images in the test, and training sets and the generated vectors are passed
through the SOM at each step, thereby, creating new training and test sets in
the output space created by self-organizing map.
A convolutional neural network is trained on the newly created training
set. The network consists of a set of layers, each of which contains one or more
planes. Multiple planes are used to detect multiple features. The authors also
experimented with training a standard multi-layer perceptron for comparison,
but it resulted in poorer performance since the MLP does not have inbuilt variance to minor translation and local deformation.
With respect to computational complexity, the SOM takes considerable
time to train. But the system can be extended to cover new classes without retraining. It also took considerable time to train the convolutional network. To
overcome this issue, the author suggests breaking the convolutional block into
two: the initial feature extraction layer and the final feature extraction and classification layer. Replacing the second part with another type of classifier such
as a nearest neighbor classifier greatly reduces the training time for the NN
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when adding new classes.
On the whole, the self organizing map provides a quantization of the
image samples into a topological space where inputs that are nearby in the
original space are also nearby in the output space, which results in invariance
to minor changes in the image samples. Also the convolution NN provides for
partial invariance to translation, rotation, scale and deformation. Substituting
the Karhunen- Lo`eve transform for the self organizing map produced slightly
worse results. With 5 images per person from the ORL database, the authors
claim that the proposed method resulted in 3.8% error.

4.5.4 A Local Global Graph Approach for Facial Expression Recognition
This work [76] [77] presents a local global graph approach for recognizing facial expressions from static images irrespective of varying illumination,
shadows, and cluttered backgrounds.
Initially a neural network to detect skin in real world images, based on
color constancy method is presented. Later, the Local-Global Graph (LGG) method is presented here for detecting faces and facial expressions with a maximum confidence from skin segmented images. The LGG approach first extracts
the most important facial features and then inter-relates them for face and facial expressions; i.e., combining local information with the global information.
Facial expression recognition from the detected face images is obtained by
comparing the LG expression graphs with the existing LG expression models
present in the LGG database.
Neural Network: A NN is used for adapting skin color under various
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illumination conditions. First, the images are color corrected based on the illuminant estimate of the NN. The skin regions in the NN stabilized images are
then detected using a simple threshold operation. The advantage of the NN
method for color adaptation is that it does not have any inherent assumptions
about the object surfaces in the image or the illumination sources as the input
to the network is only the color from the image.
Initially, the NN is trained so as to adapt to the skin color using random
images from a database consisting of images collected under various illumination conditions both indoor and outdoor, and containing skin colors of different ethnic groups. The color correction step assigns achromatic (gray) to skin
pixels. The second skin detection stage classifies the skin and non skin pixels
using a threshold based on the achromatic value of the color corrected images.
It should be noted that building an accurate classifier which can detect
all the skin types under all possible illuminations, shadows, cluttered backgrounds and makeup, using visible spectrum is still an unsolved question.
Local region graph (Facial Feature Region Graph): A local graph is
built to encode the spatial relationships of the line segments that are a result of
a curve fitting procedure on the segmented regions produced by the neural
network. Each facial region is represented by a local graph, and to identify the
segmented regions as facial regions, we need to match the local graph of the
segmented regions to the stored model local graphs in the database.
It is also important to identify the geometrical positions and placements
of the facial features along with identifying those features. The authors use the
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Voronoi Tessellation method, the Delaunay triangulation, and the Local-Global
graphs as the basic representation of the image structure. Matching two graphs
comprises of establishing point correspondences between two graphs node sets
that maximizes the likelihood between two graphs, given the spatial constraints. The extra step needed for recognizing facial expressions is that we
need to compare the image LG graph with the existing expression LG graphs.
The proposed LGG method does not require any training samples. The
graph method is invariant to scale, rotations, to a certain extent, to pose, and is
shown to perform robustly under various illumination conditions when combined with the neural constancy based skin detection. Five facial features are
used to represent an expression and the authors propose to use other features
such as furrows and cheeks, and also indicate facial motion during an expression.

4.5.5 Comparison of Neural Network Algorithms for Face Recognition
The authors present a comparison of neural methods of recognizing
faces using three different compression techniques, namely, wavelets, moments, and F-CORE coefficients [78]. Different types of faces were used as inputs: normal with different facial expressions, clear of noise and noise contaminated, smiling and serious ones, as well as effects of occlusion or missing
parts of the faces were considered.
The images were obtained from different individuals with a JVC camcorder. The images were saved in a TGA format. With custom made software,
using the Laplacian pyramid structure, the images were reduced in size and
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further compressed by several methods. The compression was done in order to
extract features that could be used as inputs to a NN. Before compression took
place, some processing was also done on the images to normalize the data for
better comparisons later on. Since the images were taken under different luminance and background conditions, a masking process is used to segment the
face from its background.
F-CORE Method: The Fourier based Compression Reconstruction technique was developed by Micheli-Tzanakou and Binge. After performing the
DFT and finding the power spectrum of an image, it sorts the coefficients from
maximum to minimum. Once this is accomplished, a user selectable percent of
these coefficients is stored along with their co-ordinates in the power spectrum.
The rest of the coefficients are set to zero. If the reconstruction is desired, the
saved coefficients are put back in the original position and the so formed power spectrum is used in an inverse DFT. The image so formed is then used as a
first “guess” of an image that is refined to perfection by algebraic reconstruction techniques. In order to do that, the sums of each column and of each row
in the image are also saved. A multiplicative algebraic technique is used until
perfection of the image is achieved.
Invariant Moments: The system has been designed for the representation of grayscale images by invariant moments. A set of moments is computed
that are invariant to translation, rotation and scaling so these can be used as
inputs to a neural network for the recognition of human faces from various images. The type of invariant moments that has been used in this system is
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known as Hu‟s moments.
Using a 2D continuous function f(x,y), moment of order (p+q) is defined as:
mpq =

 x

p

y q f ( x, y)dxdy

for p = 0, 1, 2, 3, ….. and q = 0, 1, 2, 3, …..
Correspondingly, the central moments can be defined as:
µpq =

 ( x  x' )

p

( y  y' ) q f ( x, y)dxdy

Here, x‟ = m10/ m00 and y‟ = m01/ m00.
The third order central moments are calculated and normalized. From
these normalized central moments, the seven invariant moments are computed.
Wavelet Decomposition: The principal drawback with Fourier Transforms is its inability to analyze a signal locally. To overcome this, wavelet
transform is used and is built by dilating and translating a unique function
g(x). This decomposition defines an orthogonal multi-resolution representation
called a wavelet representation. It is computed with a pyramidal algorithm based
on convolutions with quadrature mirror filters. A wavelet transform can be interpreted as decomposition into a set of frequency channels having the same
bandwidth on a logarithmic scale. The resolution of the wavelet transform varies with scale parameter. Large scale implies coarse resolution in spatial domain and fine in frequency domain, whereas small scale implies coarse resolution in frequency domain and fine in spatial domain. The multi resolution de96

composition is critically sampled, i.e. number of samples in the representation
is equal to the number of samples in the signal. This allows one to violate the
Nyquist Criteria without discarding information. The 2D images of the preprocessed faces are subjected to a wavelet analysis. The wavelet transform is
based on dilations and translations of a unique function known as “wavelet,”
defined by:
gq,p(t) =

 (t  p) 

g 
|q|  q 
1

where g(t) is the wavelet prototype, corresponding to scale q and position, or space, p.
Neurocomputing: The architecture or interconnection schemes employed by neural network designs is varied as the applications, although some
have seen a special concentration through the years. Two types of training are
commonly seen: supervised and unsupervised. In supervised learning, there
exists information about the correct solution (desired transformation) of the
network for each example pattern presented to it. In unsupervised learning, no
a priori information about the desired transformation exists, and the training
must be solely based on the properties of the patterns. The author comments
that it is better to begin thinking of neuron-computing as an alternative to the
many years of sequentially dominated processing. Neural networks are a specialized form of parallel distributed processing (PDP) systems, and can be useful as a machine, but they must be looked at as a machine and not as a biological blue print.
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Feature Extraction: A good feature extraction routine will compress the
input space to a lower dimensionality while still maintaining a large portion of
the information contained in the original pattern space. In unsupervised situations, the only information available to the feature extraction module is the statistical distribution of the patterns. In such a scenario, it is impossible to quantitatively analyze the effectiveness of a feature extraction routine in improving
pattern classification. However, there are operators designed to maintain high
information content in the features (as compared to the original measurement
pattern) with a minimal number of dimensions. For a classification problem,
the operator‟s input to the network is a feature vector, whereas the outputs are
represented so that one output node per class or template is assigned, and for a
feature vector from class I the desired output is shown for one neuron being
ON while the rest of the output neurons are OFF.
Multi-layer Perceptron: Common network architectures consist of multiple layers of neurons, where each neuron in layer 1 is connected to all neurons in layer 2. The input layer receives external stimuli and the output layer
generates the output of the network. The hidden layer and all the interconnections are responsible for the neuron-computation. As the number of neurons
increases, problem complexity increases as does the time to train the network.
Only after training is the network capable of performing the task it was designed to do.
The Back Propagation Algorithm: The back propagation is a learning
scheme where the error is back propagated layer by layer and used to update
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the weights. The algorithm is a gradient descent method that minimizes the
error between the desired output and the actual output calculated by the MLP.
The gradient descent method updates an arbitrary weight, w, in the network
by the following rule:
w(n+1) = w(n) + ∆w(n)
where , ∆w(n) = -k (∂E/∂w(n))
where „n‟ is the iteration number and „k‟ is a scaling constant.
There are many variations to the basic algorithm that have been proposed to speed the convergence of the system. Convergence is defined as a reduction in the over all error below a minimum threshold. It is the point at
which the network is said to be fully trained. One method used in this article is
the inclusion of momentum term in the update equation as shown below:
w(n+1) = w(n) -k (∂E/∂w(n)) + a∆w(n)
where „k‟ is the learning rate and is taken as 0.25 and „a‟ is a constant
momentum term.
The ALOPEX algorithm: The ALOPEX process is an optimization procedure that has been successfully demonstrated in a wide variety of applications. It incorporates a stochastic element to avoid local extremes in search of
the global optimum of the cost function. The cost function is problem dependent and is generally a function of a large number of parameters. ALOPEX iteratively updates all parameters simultaneously based on cross-correlation of
local changes, ∆Xi, and the global response change ∆R, plus an additive noise.
All parameters Xi are changed simultaneously at each iteration accord99

ing to the equation
Xi = Xi(n-1) + ¥∆Xi(n)∆R + ri (n)
The basic concept is that this cross-correlation provides a direction of
movement for the next iteration. The general ALOPEX updating equation is
explained as follows. Xi(n) are the parameters to be updated, „n‟ is the iteration
number, and R() is the cost function, of which the best solution in terms of Xi is
sought. Gamma, ¥, is a scaling constant, ri (n) is a random number from a
Gaussian distribution whose mean and standard deviation are varied and
∆Xi(n) and ∆R are found by:
∆Xi = Xi(n-1) - Xi(n-2)
R(n) = R(n-1) – R(n-2)
The calculation of R(n) is problem dependent and can be modified easily. Additional constraints include a maximal change permitted for Xi, for one
iteration. This bounded step size prevents the algorithm from drastic changes
from one iteration to the next. These drastic changes often lead to long periods
of oscillations without convergence.
Results:
After pre-processing, the feature vectors are fed to the NN as inputs.
Several options were used, such as the performance of effectiveness of the features used, the convergence of the algorithms, their recognition ability as well
as their performance on noisy and incomplete images. All the three methods of
compression converge to the same level eventually but the wavelets seem to
perform in a much smoother way and much faster than the rest.
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When the NN was tested with the images used in training, recognition
for ALOPEX was 99%. The training with back-propagation was inferior and so
was its testing. Also, the number of iterations that back-propagation needed for
convergence was much higher than the ones needed for ALOPEX. Features also played an important role in the recognition rate of the Neural Network. For
tilted and smiling faces or profiles, invariant moments performed better. The FCORE co-efficients were most robust to noise and partially occluded faces.

4.6

Combining Biometric Techniques
Combining two or more biometric technologies yields better perfor-

mance and reliability, reducing false rejections and false acceptance rates by the
biometric systems. In this section we review representative works that describe
combining two biometric technologies.

4.6.1 Fusion of Face and Speech Data for Person Identity Verification
Identity authentication task is a binary classification problem: reject or
accept identity claim. Combining/fusing information based on a different
modality like speech, face, and/or fingerprint increases the performance and
robustness of identity authentication systems. In this work [79], the authors
propose to evaluate different binary classification schemes like support vector
machine, multilayer perceptrons, C4.5 decision tree, Fisher‟s linear discriminant and Bayesian classifier, to carry on the fusion. The authors concentrate on
the biometric identity verification problem, where the user states his or her
identity and this is verified with a database to accept or reject the claim.
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The first method investigated is the elastic graph matching (EGM) method. Each face is represented by a set of feature vectors positioned on nodes of
a coarse, rectangular grid placed on the image. As features, the modulus of
complex Gabor responses from filters with six orientations and three resolutions are used. Comparing two faces corresponds to matching and adapting a
grid taken from one image to the features of the other image, taking into account both the feature vectors of each node and the deformation information
attached to the edges. The matching is done in two steps, initially a rigid
matching is performed and then this rigidly matched grid is deformed to minimize the distances between the reference and input feature vectors. The contributions from each node are considered equally, which may be of disadvantage since the contributions of each node to the distance are different.
The second method investigated is the speaker verification method.
Both text-dependent and text-independent methods are investigated.
In the text-independent speaker verification, liner prediction cepstral
co-efficients are calculated from the audio signal. The 12 LPC coefficients along
with the signal energy yield the 13 dimensional feature vector. Covariance matrix for these features is calculated, and during testing the covariance matrix for
the input signals is calculated, and their arithmetic harmonic sphericity measure is used as similarity measure.
In the case of text-dependent speaker verification, Hidden Markov
Models (HMM) are explored. When a user claims a certain identity, the HMM
of the claimed identity will be used to compute the likelihood of the feature
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vector being generated by the client, i.e., the true claimed identity. Similarly,
the HMM modeling the world (or impostors) will be used to compute the likelihood of the feature vector being generated by an impostor. The decision is
then made by comparing the likelihood ratio to a predefined threshold. All
models were trained based on the maximum likelihood criterion using the
Baum–Welch algorithm and verified using the Viterbi algorithm to calculate
the likelihood.
Having computed the match using the above methods, a verification
decision is made based on the fusion of the above computed results. For classification purposes, the following methods are evaluated:
Support vector machines: The Support Vector Machine is based on the
structural risk minimization. Better generalization capabilities are achieved
through a minimization of the bound on the generalization error. The computational complexity of the SVM during the training depends on the number of
data points rather than on their dimensionality. At the run time, the classification is a simple weighted sum.
Minimum cost Bayesian classifier: The results from distributed detection and distributed estimation are used, since the data from multi-sensors is
used. This multimodal person authentication problem reduces to using the
Bayesian classifiers. The quality of the probability fusion and decision models
depends on the modeling of the likelihood function.
Fisher’s linear discriminant: The Fischer linear discriminator maximizes the ratio of inter-class variance to intra-class variance.
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C4.5 decision trees: In a decision tree, at each node a test on a particular
attribute of the data is performed. The path of the root node to a particular leaf
is then a series of tests on the attributes that classifies the data to the class defined by the particular leaf.
Multilayer perceptron: A multi layer perceptron with 1 hidden layer is
used for classification purpose. The hidden layer is composed of 10 hidden
units. Training will be performed with the classical back propagation algorithm.
To achieve fair evaluation of the different approaches, the authors compared the performance of different fusion schemes on a large database of 295
subjects with a specified testing protocol. Among the evaluated classifiers mentioned above, the authors claim that the SVM- polynomial and the Bayesian
classifiers gave the best results, therefore outperforming the single modalities.
In the case of the Bayesian classifier, data modeling is necessary, whereas the
SVM technique does not assume any particular data distribution.

4.6.2 Combining Face and Iris Biometrics for Identity Verification
The authors present two different strategies for fusing face and iris classifiers [80]. The first method is to compute a weighted and/or un-weighted
sum to be compared with a threshold, and the second method is to use distance
measure of the feature vectors on classifiers like Fischer discriminator or Neural networks with radial basis functions.
The accuracy of face recognition is affected by illumination, pose and
facial expression. In case of an iris, image acquisition must meet stringent qual104

ity so that poor quality images are rejected. Also, an iris, can change over time,
i.e., due to diseases.
Some of the above problems can only be solved, or at least their impact
reduced, by fusing several biometric identification systems, such as face and
iris recognizers. The advantage in fusing various modalities of biometric data is
that people with specific disabilities will be able to use the biometric identification system.
Among the face recognition techniques, appearance based approaches
are the most popular. For example, PCA, ICA and LDA i.e. using Eigen face
method as face matcher. In case of iris verification, dyadic wavelets are used
are used to filter the acquired iris image.
In the weighted sum method for fusion of data, since the performance
of different classifiers is different, it is necessary to use different weights to
combine the individual classifiers. In case of the Fisher Discriminant analysis,
the face and iris matcher outputs are treated as feature vector X = (x1, x2), and
known classifiers are used to determine the separation boundary. In case of the
RBFNN, since it is a verification problem, every subject has his or her own
neural network. The feature vectors (x1, x2) are fed to the NN for classification.
Two databases were created. The first database consisted of 2,096 iris
images corresponding to 210 subjects, captured by an iris acquisition system
developed at NLPR. There are at least 5 images for one eye. Iris images of left
and right eyes are known to be different. Since not every individual provided
iris images of both the eyes, there are 303 different classes from 210 subjects.
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The images were acquired during two different sessions, one month apart.
The second database was created to illustrate the enrollment failure and
its effect on the overall verification accuracy by using some of the poor quality
iris images that would normally be rejected in an operational iris verification
system. Forty subjects and 400 iris images, (10 images per subject) were used.
In case of database 1, the performance of the fusion is worse than the
performance of the iris standalone system except for the weighted sum rule. In
case of database 2, which includes some poor quality iris images that will be
rejected by an operational iris verification system, the images are accepted and
correctly classified by the fused classifier, which means that the enrollment
failure rate can be decreased by fusion while maintaining a high accuracy.

4.7

Comparative Survey
In this section, we set up comparative survey tables to compare the var-

ious methods reviewed above along with three more biometric authentication
methodologies that are further presented in this dissertation.

4.7.1 Comparative Survey Tables
In Table 4-1 all methodologies are listed. In each cell a “1” is designated
if this feature is available or a “0” is designated if this feature is not available.
In Table 4-2 for each feature, a weight is assigned which reflects its importance
from the user‟s view (weights table). For example, computational complexity is
much more important to the engineer as compared to the user, because coding,
construction, and implementation of the device is done by the engineer since
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the lesser the computational complexity, the easier it is to code and implement
the software.
We grade each methodology, if possible, with a value (xi) between 1
and 10 (scores table). If we don‟t grade one characteristic, we make it 0, which
means that the characteristic is not available or we don‟t have enough information. Finally in Table 4-5, using the formula T 

N

 w x / N  b , a total score of
i 1

i i

each methodology is calculated, where „i‟ refers to a specific characteristic, N is
the total number of characteristics for each system and „b‟ is bias (for now,
b=0).
Below are some examples to show how the weights are assigned in the
tables.
Method Complexity: Highest Complexity – 10, Least Complexity – 1
Invasive: Highly Invasive – 10, Non-Invasive – 1
Product: Product – 10, Not a Product – 1
Training/Pre-processing: High training time – 10, Low training time – 1
Computational Requirements: High – 10, Low – 1
Similarly, the rest of the scores are assigned with 10 standing for highest score and 1 standing for the lowest score applicable for that feature. The
methods with their abbreviations are given in Table 4-1. The features with their
abbreviations are given in Table 4-2.

107

Table 4-1. List of Surveyed Biometric Methodologies

METHOD

ABBREVIATION

Speaker Verification by Means of ANNs

M1

Biometric identification through hand geometry measurements
Fast Iris Detection for Personal Verification Using Modular
Neural Nets
Fusion of Face and Speech Data for Person Identity Verification

M2

Combining Face and Iris Biometrics for Identity Verification
Face Recognition with Radial Basis Function (RBF) Neural
Networks
A State-of-the-Art Neural Network for Robust Face Verification
Fingerprints classification using artificial neural networks: a
combined structural and statistical approach
Personal authentication using palm-prints features
Speaker-specific mapping for text-independent speaker recognition
Neural Network for improved text-independent speaker identification
Fingerprint Classification by directional image partitioning

M5

M3
M4

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
M11
M12

Iris Recognition by a rotation spreading neural network

M13

Face Recognition: A convolution Neural Network Approach
A local Global Graph Approach for Facial Expression Recognition (includes An ANN based approach for image chromatic
adaptation for skin color detection)
Speaker Identification Using Neural Networks and Wavelets

M14

Comparison of Neural Network Algorithms for Face Recognition
Iris Biometric Authentication based on Local Global Graphs: An
FPGA Implementation
An FPGA implementation of the Local Global Graph based
Voice Biometric Authentication
Local Global Graph based Fingerprint Biometric Authentication

M17

M15
M16

M18
M19
M20

Table 4-2. Features Table for Biometric Methodologies

F1

Simplicity

F2

Complexity

F3

Originality

F4

Real Application
Real-Time
(Processing Time)
Product
Computational Requirements
Friendliness
(to user)

F5
F6
F7
F8

The methodology is simple.
The number of operations to be performed by the methodology for achieving
the desirable solution.
The methodology is based on original algorithms and or mathematical formulas or the synergistic combination of simple methods composing a new original method.
The methodology is applicable to solve real problems of high importance.
The methodology can be implemented in real-time. It can produce results as
soon as the input data is fed to the methodology.
The methodology is a commercial product.
The computational power required by the methodology to produce desirable
results.
The methodology offers a user-friendly interface.
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Performance and
Test on Real Cases
Reliability

Sufficient results and performance statistics are presented to back up methodology’s efficiency on real cases.
The methodology produces reliable results.

F13

Robustness
Training Time (preprocessing stage)
Cost

F14

Invasive

F15

F18

Security Levels
Requires Training
to User
Further Improvements
Implementation

The methodology produces acceptable results under any circumstances.
The methodology requires extra time for preprocessing the data set (i.e. NN
training).
The amount of money needed for the purchase or usage of the methodology.
The methodology requires a preprocessing stage, such as a surgical operation,
in order to produce its results.
Security level that the methodology can provide.

F19

Prototype

F9
F10
F11
F12

F16
F17

The methodology requires that the user be trained.
The methodology has the potential of further enhancement.
The methodology has already been implemented in a useable environment.
The methodology has been successfully implemented at the experimental
stage and produced desirable results.

Table 4-3. Feature v/s Methodology Table for Biometric Methodologies

F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6

F7

F8

F9

F10

F11

F12

F13

F14

F15

F16

F17

F18

F19

M1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M2

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1

M3

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M4

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M5

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M6

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1

M7

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1

M8

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1

M9

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1

M10

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M11

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M12

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1

M13

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M14

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1

M15

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1
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M16

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M17

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

X

1

1

1

1

M18

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M19

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

M20

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

Table 4-4. Weights Table (Biometric Methodologies)
F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6

F7

F8

F9

F10

F11

F12

F13

F14

F15

F16

F17

F18

F19

USER'S PERSPECTIVE

2

1

1

10

9

10

1

10

10

10

10

3

2

10

10

10

9

9

9

ADMINISTRATOR'S
PERSPECTIVE

7

1

1

10

9

10

1

8

10

10

10

3

9

7

10

8

9

9

9

ENGINEER'S
PERSPECTIVE

9

10

7

10

9

10

10

8

10

10

10

9

7

8

10

7

10

9

9

AVERAGE

6

4

3

10

9

10

4

8.7

10

10

10

5

6

8.3

10

8.3

9.3

9

9

Table 4-5. Scores Table (Biometric Methodologies)
Final
F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6

F7

F8

F9

F10

F11

F12

F13

F14

F15

F16

F17

F18

F19

Total
Total

M1

7

8

5

7

8

0

8

9

7

6

6

9

0

1

7

9

7

7

8

929.4

48.92

M2

8

6

6

8

9

0

6

7

7

6

6

7

0

1

7

6

8

6

8

889.4

46.81

M3

7

7

6

8

9

0

7

8

8

9

8

8

0

1

8

6

7

8

8

983.8

51.78

M4

6

8

7

7

8

0

9

7

7

6

6

9

0

1

9

8

7

8

8

936.7

49.3

M5

6

8

7

7

8

0

8

8

8

8

9

9

0

1

9

7

6

8

8

983.8

51.78

M6

7

7

6

6

8

0

7

7

7

6

6

8

0

1

7

7

7

7

8

875.4

46.07

M7

7

7

6

7

8

0

8

7

7

6

6

8

0

1

7

7

7

7

8

889.4

46.81

M8

6

8

7

8

9

0

8

8

8

8

8

8

0

1

8

6

8

8

8

988.1

52.01

M9

8

7

6

8

8

0

6

7

7

6

6

7

0

1

6

6

8

6

8

874.4

46.02

M10

7

7

8

8

8

0

7

9

7

6

7

8

0

1

7

9

7

7

8

945.4

49.76

M11

7

7

5

7

8

0

7

9

6

6

6

8

0

1

7

9

7

7

8

906.4

47.71

M12

7

8

6

8

8

0

8

8

8

8

8

8

0

1

8

6

8

8

8

982.1

51.69

M13

7

7

7

6

8

0

7

8

9

9

9

7

0

1

8

6

7

8

8

972.8

51.2

110

M14

6

7

7

6

7

0

8

7

6

6

7

7

0

1

7

7

7

7

8

862.4

45.39

M15

7

8

8

7

7

0

8

7

6

6

7

6

0

1

7

7

7

7

8

880.4

46.34

M16

7

7

8

7

8

0

7

9

6

6

7

7

0

1

7

7

7

7

8

903.8

47.57

M17

7

7

8

7

8

0

7

7

7

6

6

7

0

1

7

7

7

7

8

886.4

46.65

M18

7

7

9

6

8

0

7

8

9

9

9

7

0

1

8

6

7

8

8

978.8

51.51

M19

7

8

9

7

8

0

8

9

7

6

6

9

0

1

7

9

7

7

8

941.4

49.54

M20

6

8

9

8

9

0

8

8

8

8

8

8

0

1

8

6

8

8

8

994.1

52.32

Table 4-6. Weights from Table 4-4 (Biometric Methodologies)

Features

F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6

F7

F8

F9

F10

F11

F12

F13

F14

F15

F16

F17

F18

F19

weights

6

4

3

10

9

10

4

8.7

10

10

10

5

6

8.3

10

8.3

9.3

9

9

4.8

Conclusion
In the previous sections we provided a comparative study on neural

nets based biometric methodologies from a selective set of works. We also set
up a comparative survey tables to compare the various works and methods
that we reviewed. We find that iris scan and fingerprint scan offer the better
performance as compared to face, voice, and palm print based biometrics. We
also see that combined biometrics yield better results as compared to relying on
just one biometric measure. It is also important to mention here that our comparative study does not intend to identify one or more methods as better than
others, which requires running these methods under the same conditions or on
the same data sets, but to indicate the status of the current performance of these
methods and their potential improvements if this is desirable.
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5

CHAPTER FIVE
In this chapter, we present the SCAN-SP architecture with respect to its

biometric authentication capabilities. The FPGA based co-processor architecture to implement iris, voice and fingerprint based biometric authentication is
presented along with the new instruction set to handle the off-chip coprocessor. Further, we describe the Local-Global (LG) Graph methodology
based iris, voice and fingerprint biometric authentication.

5.1

SCAN-SP Architecture – Biometric Capabilities
In this section, we describe the FPGA co-processor interface along with

new instructions to implement iris, voice and fingerprint based biometric authentication. The new instructions enable the operation of the FPGA based coprocessor to implement the above mentioned operations. A tightly coupled
coprocessor architecture with dedicated data-path and a local memory system
is required. The coprocessor interacts with the main processor through asynchronous FIFOs which enable the coprocessor to be implemented with a clock
frequency different from the processor system. The coprocessor is integrated
into the processor subsystem using a dedicated coprocessor interface as shown
in Fig.5-1. A dedicated coprocessor interface provides higher data rate between
processor cache and the coprocessor and provides special purpose instructions
to handle communication with the coprocessor.
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Fig. 5-1. FPGA Co-processor Interface for Biometric Authentication

Data transfer across the external memory and the coprocessor memory
is implemented by transferring four bytes of data simultaneously on the 32 bit
data bus. The four bytes on the data bus are decrypted using the SCAN methodology and the XOR key before being stored in the coprocessor memory. Similarly the four bytes are encrypted using the SCAN methodology and the XOR
key before being stored in the external memory. The new coprocessor instructions to enable Local-Global methodology based biometric authentication are
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explained next:
ACQUIRE_IRIS – The acquire iris biometric (ACQUIRE_IRIS) instruction moves the acquired iris biometric into the co-processor memory.
ACQUIRE_VOICE – The acquire voice biometric (ACQUIRE_VOICE)
instruction moves the acquired speech signal into the co-processor memory.
ACQUIRE_FINGERPRINT – The acquire fingerprint biometric (ACQUIRE_FINGERPRINT) instruction moves the acquired fingerprint biometric
into the co-processor memory.
EXTRACT_LG_IRIS – The extract local-global graph from iris biometric
(EXTRACT_LG_IRIS) instruction extracts the local-global graph from the acquired iris biometric present in the co-processor memory. The acquired iris
biometric should be present in the co-processor memory before this instruction
is executed. The output of this instruction, i.e., the LG graph of the iris biometric is stored in the co-processor memory.
EXTRACT_LG_VOICE – The extract local-global graph from voice biometric (EXTRACT_LG_VOICE) instruction extracts the local-global graph from
the acquired voice biometric present in the co-processor memory. The acquired
voice biometric should be present in the co-processor memory before this instruction is executed. The output of this instruction, i.e., the LG graph of the
voice biometric is stored in the co-processor memory.
EXTRACT_LG_FINGERPRINT – The extract local-global graph from
fingerprint biometric (EXTRACT_LG_FINGERPRINT) instruction extracts the
local-global graph from the acquired fingerprint biometric present in the co114

processor memory. The acquired fingerprint biometric should be present in the
co-processor memory before this instruction is executed. The output of this instruction, i.e., the LG graph of the fingerprint biometric is stored in the coprocessor memory.
STORE_LG_IRIS – The store local-global graph for iris biometric
(STORE_LG_IRIS) instruction removes the extracted local-global graph for the
iris biometric from the co-processor memory and stores it in the external memory.
STORE_LG_VOICE – The store local-global graph for voice biometric
(STORE_LG_VOICE) instruction removes the extracted local-global graph for
the voice biometric from the co-processor memory and stores it in the external
memory.
STORE_LG_FINGERPRINT – The store local-global graph for fingerprint biometric (STORE_LG_ FINGERPRINT) instruction removes the extracted local-global graph for the fingerprint biometric from the co-processor
memory and stores it in the external memory.
LOAD_LG_IRIS – The load local-global graph for iris biometric
(LOAD_LG_IRIS) instruction moves the local-global graph for iris biometric
from external memory into the coprocessor memory.
LOAD_LG_VOICE – The load local-global graph for voice biometric
(LOAD_LG_VOICE) instruction moves the local-global graph for voice biometric from external memory into the coprocessor memory.
LOAD_LG_FINGERPRINT – The load local-global graph for fingerprint
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biometric (LOAD_LG_ FINGERPRINT) instruction moves the local-global
graph for fingerprint biometric from external memory into the coprocessor
memory.
AUTHEN_LG_IRIS – The authenticate local-global graph for iris biometric (AUTHEN_LG_IRIS) instruction compares the local-global graph extracted
from the acquired iris biometric with the local-global graph of the iris biometric
already present in the co-processor memory. The output of this instruction is a
binary value, 0 indicating rejection and 1 indicating acceptance of the identity
claim based on the presented iris biometric.
AUTHEN_LG_VOICE – The authenticate local-global graph for voice
biometric (AUTHEN_LG_VOICE) instruction compares the local-global graph
extracted from the acquired voice biometric with the local-global graph of the
voice biometric already present in the co-processor memory. The output of this
instruction is a binary value, 0 indicating rejection and 1 indicating acceptance
of the identity claim based on the presented voice biometric.
AUTHEN_LG_FINGERPRINT – The authenticate local-global graph for
fingerprint biometric (AUTHEN_LG_ FINGERPRINT) instruction compares
the local-global graph extracted from the acquired fingerprint biometric with
the local-global graph of the fingerprint biometric already present in the coprocessor memory. The output of this instruction is a binary value, 0 indicating
rejection and 1 indicating acceptance of the identity claim based on the presented fingerprint biometric.
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5.2

LG Graph based Iris Biometric Authentication
Iris recognition is a method of biometric authentication that uses pat-

tern recognition techniques based on high-resolution images of the iris. Iris
scan based security systems offer robust and reliable authentication as compared to other biometric methodologies. In this section, we present a biometric
authentication system based on iris scan, i.e., the identity claimed by the subject is verified by comparing his (or her) iris biometric against a database. A
unique Local-Global graph methodology to extract, store and compare iris patterns for the purpose of authentication is presented. Local features from the iris
image are first extracted and then combined to form a Global graph that is
stored in the system database. Authenticity is established by comparing the
Global graph of the presented iris image with the Global graph of the stored
reference image. Comparison is done by calculating the distance between the
two Global graphs and based on a threshold, the authenticity is established.
LG graph methodology is a computationally intensive process as it involves executing feature extraction algorithm repeatedly over the input image.
Further, comparison of the test and reference graphs, if implemented in software will consume expensive clock cycles, thus increasing the authentication
time. Therefore, a hardware implementation of these critical sections, namely
feature extraction and graph comparison is necessary to enable real-time authentication. Although, iris based biometric authentication has been extensively
researched, it is still an active research area owing to increasing security and
privacy concerns in the digital world. In this context, we present the LG graph
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methodology as an incremental methodology for efficiently representing iris
patterns via their features and the features‟ relationships.

5.2.1 Pre-processing the Iris Image
Pre-processing the acquired iris image is necessary before the application of LG graph methodology to extract the iris features. Pre-processing consists of four major steps: (1) Iris localization, (2) Image smoothing, (3) Log-polar
transformation and (4) Image segmentation. These steps are elaborated further
in this section.
5.2.1.1 Iris localization
Along with the region of interest, i.e., iris, the acquired image also contains pupil, parts of the sclera and other camera artifacts, as seen in Fig 5-2a.
Therefore, prior to feature extraction, the location of the iris must be established in the acquired image. For the purpose of iris localization, the first step is
to find the edges in the acquired iris image. Optimal edge detection algorithms
like the Canny edge detector can be used to obtain continuous edges. The output of the edge detection process is a binary image highlighting the detected
edges. Once the edge detection is completed, Hough Transform is applied to
detect the circles in the binary edge image, as shown in Fig 5-2b. The Hough
transform can be used to determine the parameters of a circle when a number
of points that fall on the circle‟s perimeter are known. A circle with radius R
and center (a, b) can be described with the parametric equations:
x = a + Rcos(Ф)
y = b + Rsin(Ф)
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When the angle Ф sweeps through the full 360 degree range, the points
(x, y) trace the perimeter of a circle. The detection of the circle highlights the
location of the pupil. A circular mask is created with the centre of the pupil as
the centre of the circular mask, as seen in Fig 5-2c. The radius of the circular
mask is pre-determined and is expected to be an inherent characteristic of the
iris image acquisition system. The acquired iris image is then overlaid with the
circular mask as seen in Fig 5-2d. The circular mask highlights only the iris
while masking the pupil, parts of the sclera and other camera artifacts. Iris localization using Hough transforms is elaborated further in [95]. An FPGA implementation of Hough transforms is presented in [99].

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Fig. 5-2. (a)Acquired iris image (b) Edge image (c) Circular mask (d)Localization of iris

5.2.1.2 Image smoothing
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The next step is to smooth the localized iris image. Image smoothing is
necessary to eliminate trivial regions that can appear in the segmented iris image. Image segmentation is the last but critical step in pre-processing the iris
image prior to application of the LG graph methodology. These trivial regions
appear as spurious regions in the segmented image leading to unreliable results during comparison of test and reference iris images. A simple averaging
filter of size 3x3 or 5x5 can be selected for smoothing the iris image. It is noted
that over-smoothing the image using a bigger window kernel will result in loss
of information and improper segmentation. Hardware implementation of image filtering operations, a smoothing filter in our case, is described in [101].
5.2.1.3 Log-Polar transformation
After smoothing the iris image, log-polar transformation is applied on
the smoothed iris image. The log-polar transformation is a conformal mapping
from the points on the Cartesian plane to points in the log-polar plane. Logpolar representation of an image has three notable advantages over its Cartesian counterpart. The first advantage of application of the log-polar transformation is data reduction. The second advantage of the log-polar geometry is
that objects occupying the central high resolution part of the visual field become dominant over coarsely sampled background elements in the image periphery, thus embedding an implicit focus of attention in the center of the visual field. The third advantage is that image rotation in Cartesian plane results in
translational shifts in the log-polar plane. Thus, the application of log-polar
transformation on the localized and smoothed iris image prior to image seg120

mentation eliminates redundant information and increases focus on features
necessary for implementing the LG graph methodology. Fig 5-3 shows the logpolar transformation of the localized and smoothed iris image. The mapping
from Cartesian plane to the log-polar plane can be easily implemented using a
Look-up Table. A reconfigurable implementation of the log-polar transformation of the iris image is presented in [97].

Fig. 5-3. Log-Polar Transformation after Iris Localization

5.2.1.4 Image segmentation
Once we obtain the log-polar transformed image, the final step in the
pre-processing stage is image segmentation. Segmentation is a crucial part of
the algorithm because the LG graph representation directly depends on the results of segmentation. The segmentation algorithm must incorporate invariance
to noise and rotation in the presented test image. Invariance to noise and rotation means that the segmentation results should consistently produce the same
number of regions and the same sizes of regions for the same iris image, even if
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permissible amount of noise or rotation is incorporated in the image. If the
segmentation algorithm is not invariant to noise and rotation, the number and
sizes of the segments (or regions) will differ and formation of the LG graphs
will not be reliable resulting in inaccurate authentication. Thus we require a
robust segmentation method to enable reliable authentication.
Noise in the acquired iris image due to intrinsic camera properties can
be estimated and eliminated by applying a pre-determined de-convolution filter, thereby, achieving invariance to noise. Noise de-convolution is implemented on the iris image before transforming to the log-polar domain. However, effects due to rotation cannot be eliminated as a pre-processing or postprocessing step to image segmentation. Invariance to rotation has to be an intrinsic property of the segmentation algorithm itself. Different segmentation
methods can be explored for this purpose.
In the work presented in [92], the authors describe a hardware architecture based on Stretch technology to implement segmentation of color images.
Regions that have fewer pixels can be merged into bigger neighboring regions
or two or more smaller regions can be merged to form one bigger region. The
threshold for determining the minimum number of pixels that a region must
have to exist in the segmented image is chosen appropriately. Since the segmentation algorithm presented in [92] possesses the ability to merge smaller
regions into bigger regions based on a threshold, it can be made to incorporate
invariance to rotation.
We further explored the application of k-means clustering algorithm to
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implement iris image segmentation. The clustering algorithm produced extremely reliable segmentation results since the locations of the regions‟ centroids is normalized and the number of regions can be made a constant, „k‟. Also,
clusters that have similar characteristics of RGB values, but are located at different co-ordinate locations share the same label, enabling effective grouping of
clusters and rendering invariance to rotation (ranging from 0 to 360 degrees) of
test image. However, an appropriate choice of „k‟ is very important for reliable
results. For smaller iris image databases, a smaller value of „k‟ can yield good
segmentation results (and hence authentication), but as the database size increases the value of „k‟ will eventually increase. The LG graph construction
presented in this work is based on the segmentation results using the k-means
clustering algorithm. Fig.5-4. shows the resultant image after segmenting the
log-polar image using k-means clustering for the R-color space. Similarly the G
and B color spaces are also segmented. An FPGA implementation of the kmeans clustering for color images is described in [98].
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Fig. 5-4. Segmentation (based on region labeling) of Log-Polar image using k-means
clustering (R-color space with k = 51)

5.2.2 Applying LG Graph Methodology
In this section, we present the LG graph methodology to extract features and define relationships between regions in the segmented log-polar
transformed iris image. The graph is one of the oldest and very powerful methodologies developed for a great variety of the computer science problems.
The graph method is mainly used to apply spatial constraints to key nodes.
There are many ways to represent graph. Here we briefly review the ones related to the representation and recognition of images, objects and their features,
such as Voronoi Tessellation and Delaunay Graph or graphs with attributes. In
order to recognize a pattern or model, different techniques have been proposed. Graph editing method is used to compute graph distance and, in turn,
the graph distance becomes the measure of image similarity. Relational graphs
are considered a good approach to describe pictures or scenes for pattern rec124

ognition. Fu and Sanfeliu used a relational graph to represent characters [101].
They proposed descriptive graph grammars as rules to organize and compare
graphs. There are, however, some common limitations with graph matching
problem. First, the matching of the model to the data image is node location
driven. In other words the matching criterion is minimizing the mean square
over all pixels of the difference between the model and the data image. This
does not ensure that specific points of interest or landmarks be matched with
great precision. Second, because of the inherent non-linearity of the problem,
and the fact that the deformations are high dimensional, the computational
tools for calculating the match must use relaxation techniques, which runs the
risk of converging to a local minimum that corresponds to a poor match.
Our Local-Global (LG) graph method adds local part information into
graph. The graph is a more accurate representation of an object. Thus, we avoid
using a non-linear graph matching function. It is wise not to say much, since
the local and global graphs used here are not new but incremental methodologies for efficiently representing images via their visible features and the features‟ relationships. Thus, here the LG graph is capable of describing with adjustable accuracy and robustness the features contained in an iris image. The
main components of the LG graph are: (i) the local graph that represents the
information related with size, color, texture and location of the segmented regions and (ii) the global graph that represents the relationships among the
segmented regions for the entire image. The nodes Pi of the global graph include the local information like the texture information, the location and the
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distances between other regions, size and relative magnitude of the segmented
regions and the orientation of these regions. The local-global image graph
components, with respect to the segmented log-polar iris image are briefly described below.
The Region or Local Graph L holds information of the log-polar iris image region after segmentation. L is given by:
L = N1ac12N2ac23N3 … Nkack1N1  Ni apijNj  …  NnardnmNm …
where,  represents the graph relationship operator, and each Ni maintains the structural features of the corresponding iris regions, i.e., Ni = { location (l), orientation (o), size (s), texture (t), compactness (c), distance from reference (d) }, and each aij holds the relationships among these regions, i.e., aij = {
relative distance (rd), relative orientation (ro), relative magnitude (rm) }.
The Global Graph G is also a part of the LG graph by offering additional information about the iris regions and their connectivity. G is given by:
G = K1ac12K2ac23K3 … KkackqKq  Ki apijKj  …  KnardnmKm …
where,  represents the graph relationship operator, and each Ki maintains the structural features of the corresponding iris region on a global scale.
Thus, Ki = { location (l), orientation (o), size (s), texture (t), compactness (c), distance from reference (d) }, and aij holds the relationships among these regions.
Thus, aij = { relative distance (rd), relative orientation (ro), relative magnitude
(rm) }.
Since texture is one of the features of the segmented iris regions that we
consider, we have to ensure that we pick rotationally invariant textural descrip126

tors. Methods like the gray-level co-occurrence matrix (GLCM) are not rotationally invariant and hence cannot be used to extract texture features for the
LG graph. Texture primitives such as mean intensity (mi1), median intensity
(mi2), mode intensity (mi3), variance (v), standard deviation (sd), entropy (e),
normalized histogram (nh), skewness (s) and kurtosis (k) are rotationally invariant as well as scale invariant and hence we use these features to extract textural information from the segmented iris regions. Though, these texture primitives will not be helpful in texture reconstruction, they can hold enough information to enable authentication of the iris biometric along with other structural
features that form the LG graph.
A database of LG graph representations of the reference (enrolled) iris
images is created and the LG graph representation of the presented test image
is compared against this database. Based on a distance metric calculated between the reference and test LG graphs, the authenticity of the subject is established.

5.2.3 FPGA Synthesis Results
As mentioned previously, LG graph methodology is a computationally
intensive process. In order to decrease the time required to establish authenticity of the subject and to eliminate software overhead, we need hardware implementation to accelerate critical sections of the algorithm. FPGA implementation of compute intensive sections like Hough transformation, image smoothing, log-polar transformation and image segmentation has been addressed before in [96][100][101][98][93][99] as explained in the previous sections. There127

fore, in this section, we present the results of reconfigurable implementation
and mapping of critical sections of the LG graph methodology, i.e., feature extraction and graph comparison, which has not been addressed before. Using
Matlab/Simulink we are able to rapidly simulate various partitions of the applications on hardware and software. Matlab/Simulink provides a hardwaresoftware co-simulation environment where we can execute portions of the applications as software programs and other portions as customized hardware
implementation [103]. The hardware-software co-simulation can be further realized as a hardware-software co-implementation by generating the Hardware
Description Language and bit-streams for FPGA implementation. The IEEE
compliant VHDL code is generated using Matlab Simulink blocks and embedded Matlab functions. The FPGA synthesis from the generated VHDL code is
implemented using Xilinx ISE ver. 9.1i. The target FPGA is Vertex 5, specifically xc5vlx30.
We have identified the computationally intensive sections of the LG
graph methodology as seen in Table 5-1 and we map these sections of the algorithm onto a reconfigurable fabric. Table 5-1, row 1, provides the results of
FPGA synthesis of the module to calculate a region‟s magnitude. This module
increments a counter if the supplied pixel label matches the region label, thus
counting the number of pixels in a given region, i.e., the magnitude of the region. Table 5-1, row 2, provides the results of FPGA synthesis to calculate the
mean pixel intensity value in the segmented regions. Since we do not know the
number of pixels in a region beforehand, we implement an online algorithm to
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find the cumulative moving average (CMA) on the FPGA. The CMA is then
used to update the variance and hence the standard deviation. This online algorithm [102] is as shown further:
n=0
mean = 0
T=0
for each x in data
n=n+1
delta = x - mean
mean = mean + delta/n
T = T + delta*(x - mean)

//use new value of mean

end for
variance = T/(n - 1)
std_dev = sqrt(variance)
The „mean‟ and „T‟ values are updated as new pixel values are considered. This process of updating the average continues till all the pixel values in
the considered region are exhausted. Variance and standard deviation are then
calculated using the latest „T‟ value.
Table 5-1, row 3, provides the FPGA synthesis results to calculate the
skewness value of pixel intensity distribution. We use a measure of skewness
as given by Karl Pearson, which is (mean – mode) / standard_deviation. Mode
can be easily found out by constructing the histogram of the pixel intensities in
the segmented region. The pixel intensity with maximum frequency in the histogram is the mode.
Table 5-1, row 4, provides the FPGA synthesis results to calculate the
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kurtosis value of pixel intensities of each region. Kurtosis is given the formula
µ4/σ4, where µ4 is the fourth moment about the mean and σ is the standard
deviation.
Table 5-1, row 5 provides the FPGA synthesis results to calculate the entropy. Entropy is given by the formula:
e = -k Σ pi log (pi)
where pi is the probability of each pixel intensity. The summation is
from „n1‟ to „n2‟, where „n1‟ is the minimum pixel intensity and „n2‟ is the maximum pixel intensity in the region. The logarithm operation is implemented as
a Look-up Table and is capable of handling numbers 0 through 65535, which is
a sufficient range.
Table 5-1, row 6, provides the FPGA synthesis results to calculate the
Euclidean distance between the test and reference LG graphs. Euclidean distance can be used as a distance measure to measure the similarity between the
reference and test LG graphs.

Table 5-1. FPGA Synthesis Results (Iris Biometric)

FPGA Modules
1
2
3
4
5
6

Region magnitude
Mean (µ), Variance, Standard Deviation (σ)
Skewness = (mean – mode) / σ
Kurtosis = µ4/σ4
Entropy
Euclidean Distance for Feature Comparison

Slice LUTs
Used
75

Slice LUTs
available
19,200

693

19,200

4098

140
108
157

19,200
19,200
19,200

16 (max)
15 (max)
8192

319

19,200

8192

# Clock Cycles
4096

Although, Table 5-1 provides the results for single instantiation of the
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FPGA modules, these modules can be instantiated thrice to process R, G and B
slices of the considered region in parallel. In this way, three pixel intensities
can be processed in one clock cycle. Further, the module to calculate the Euclidean distance can be instantiated separately for each feature in consideration,
thus reducing software overhead and parallelizing the graph comparison operation.

5.2.4 Experimental set-up and results
The iris image database was obtained online from [96]. The database
consists of 3 x 128 iris images (i.e. 3 x 64 left and 3 x 64 right). The images are 24
bit - RGB, 576 x 768 pixels and the file format is PNG. The irises were scanned
by TOPCON TRC50IA optical device connected with SONY DXC-950P 3CCD
camera. The flow charts for iris biometric enrollment and verification are as
shown in Fig.5-5. Although, image segmentation is presented as a preprocessing stage in the previous sections, we show it as a distinct stage in Fig.55 to highlight the criticality of segmentation results in the construction of the
LG graphs and hence establishing reliable authentication.
Each localized iris image in the reference set is represented as an LG
graph as explained in the previous sections and stored in the system database.
The LG graph representation of input test image is compared against the LG
graph representation of the reference image in the database. Comparison of the
LG graphs of the test and reference images is implemented by calculating the
distance between the two graphs and based on a threshold, the authenticity is
established. This threshold, ε is determined experimentally and is defined by
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the set { ε1, ε2, ε3, …. εN }, that are the thresholds for the individual features (e.g.,
RGB values, normalized magnitude of segmented regions, normalized regions‟
centroids, normalized regions‟ orientations etc), and „N‟ stands for the number
of features extracted to form the LG graph representation. The individual features can be weighted as needed before thresholding. In our experiments, we
have weighted all the features equally. The graph pair that produces the minimum distance measure which is within the threshold ε is accepted to be a
match that establishes the authenticity of the test image. The threshold enables
us to inculcate slight variations between the reference and test images. Having
a wider threshold will enable us to accommodate larger variations in the test
image that may occur due to noise or rotation, but it will also result in the test
image matching more than one image in the database leading to wrong authentication. A narrow threshold may result in rejection of a valid test image.
Therefore, the selection of the threshold is critical in determining results of authentication.
Rotational variations, i.e., 0 to 360 degrees in steps of 10 degrees, were
introduced in the test images that had a corresponding reference in the database. Although image rotation did not change the result of segmentation (i.e.,
labeling) and graph representation, it changes the location of the regions‟ centroids. To overcome this drawback, we use normalized regions‟ centroids. Variations in scale can be easily handled by normalizing the magnitude of the
segmented regions. Distances measure like the absolute difference or Euclidean
distance can be used to measure distances between the reference and test LG
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graphs.

Fig. 5-5. Iris biometric enrollment and verification stages

In our experiments, with rotational variation ranging from 0 to 360 degrees, we obtained 92% accuracy in authentication with the following threshold parameters:


„k‟ (number of clusters) = 51



RGB mean pixel intensity = 2



RGB median pixel intensity = 4



Variation in magnitude = 5%



Variation in the location of regions‟ centroids = 2 pixels



Standard deviation of RGB pixel intensities = 2
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Skewness of pixel intensity distribution = 0.2



Kurtosis of pixel intensity distribution = 2

However, we have implemented a very narrow threshold and experimented with a subset of the proposed LG graph features. We believe that the
accuracy can be further increased by allowing for a slightly relaxed threshold.
Also, in practical situations, the rotation in the presented iris image will not
vary between 0 to 360 degrees as we have experimented. Rotational variation
in practical situations will be around +/- 50 degrees at a maximum and we obtain 100% accuracy in these ranges.

5.2.5 Conclusion
In this section, we described a method for LG graph representation of
the iris image and its application to iris biometric authentication. We presented
the results of FPGA synthesis of compute intensive sections of the LG graph
methodology, namely feature extraction and graph comparison as applied to
iris biometric authentication. The experiments presented in our work are based
on a limited database of iris images. Further work in this direction will be to
experiment using an extensive database of iris images. A detailed analysis of
the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) is necessary to
take this preliminary investigation to the next level of full scale implementation. An analysis of variation in „k‟ (number of clusters) used in the k-means
clustering algorithm for segmentation, with respect to increase in the size of iris
image database is necessary. Other rotationally invariant features like Hu Moments and Zernike Moments can be explored for the purpose of textural fea134

ture extraction along with the textural primitives that we currently consider.
Hand optimization of the VHDL code generated using Matlab blocks and embedded functions is required to enhance the performance of the synthesized
FPGA modules. Cycle accurate simulation is necessary to quantify the tradeoff
between hardware-software co-implementation and a pure software implementation. Though not implemented in this work, database encryption is preferred to address security related issues.

5.3

LG Graph based Voice Biometric Authentication
Voice based authentication methodologies are the easiest to implement

since they do not need a considerable amount of investment on hardware [47].
Existing hardware can be used along with required software to implement a
voice based identification system. Here, we present a text dependent speaker
verification system in which a predefined utterance by the user is stored in the
system database. Effectively, spoken language does not matter. Reference and
test signals are required to have identical wording. Intra-speaker variations are
induced by the emotional state of the speaker, health and aging whereas interspeaker variations are caused by different speaking habits such as rhythm and
intonation or dialects.
In this section, we propose a novel FPGA based Local-Global (LG)
graph methodology [42,48,49] for authenticating the presented speech signal.
Local features from the reference speech signal, say a spoken password, are
first extracted and then combined to form a Global graph that is stored in the
system database. Authenticity is established by comparing the Global graph of
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the presented test signal with the Global graph of the stored reference signal.
The comparison is done by calculating the distance between the two Global
graphs and based on a threshold, the authenticity is established. The LG graph
methodology is a computationally intensive process as it involves executing a
feature extraction algorithm repeatedly over the entire input signal. Furthermore, the comparison of the test and reference signals, if implemented in software, will consume expensive clock cycles, thus increasing the authentication
time. Therefore, a hardware implementation of these critical phases, namely
feature extraction and graph comparison, is necessary to enable real-time authentication. Although, voice based biometric authentication has been extensively researched, it is still an active research area owing to increasing security
and privacy concerns in the digital world. In this context, we present the LG
graph methodology as an incremental methodology for efficiently representing
speech patterns via their features and the features‟ relationships.

5.3.1

Pre-processing the Speech Signal
Prior to comparing the reference and test speech signals, some kind of

time alignment has to be performed between the two. This aligning is done by
pre-processing the reference and test speech signals. Pre-processing the speech
signals eliminates the parts of the speech signal that do not convey any information (i.e. silence), before or after the utterance of the speech. Regions of the
signal that do not convey any information are eliminated using the method of
standard deviation. The standard deviation of the samples of speech signal is
calculated using a moving window. If the window size is too small, the win136

dow will not contain enough signal information to be able to measure the desired features, if the window size is too large, the feature values will be averaged over too much, and will lose precision. In our experiments, we found that
the length of samples retained varied with the size of the window. By trial and
error, the optimum window size was found to range from 75 to 125 samples.
The speech signal was padded with the mean value of the windowed signal at
the beginning and end points of the signal in order to handle boundary problems. Mean padding was used instead of zero padding because zero padding
introduces abrupt variations in the signal that are not suitable for the standard
deviation method used to eliminate sections of no interest in the speech signal.
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Fig. 5-6. Speech Sample
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Pre-processed Reference Sample
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Fig. 5-7. Pre-processed Speech Sample

The calculated values of the standard deviation are stored in an array.
The mean value of the stored standard deviation values is calculated and the
standard deviation values in the array that are less than the calculated mean
are forced to zero. Re-sampling of the presented speech signal is done based on
the new standard deviation array. Samples of the speech signal that correspond
to zero standard deviation are eliminated. Fig. 5-6 and 5-7 show the speech
sample and its pre-processed version respectively.

5.3.2 Applying LG Graph Methodology
Once the alignment is done, the LG graphs of test and reference signals
can be extracted and compared to each other. For each pair, consisting of a test
and reference signal, a distance measure, called local distance, is computed.
The global distance is then computed by averaging the local distances over the
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length of the signal. The reference speech signal during enrollment is preprocessed as explained in the previous section. After preprocessing, the reference
signal is represented as an LG graph and stored in the system database. When
a test speech signal is presented, it is preprocessed using the same technique
and represented as an LG graph. The LG graph embeds both local information
(the shape of signal, i.e. parameters of a triangle, stored within the local graph
at each node) and global information (the topology of the signal). Individual
features of interest are extracted from the given signal and these features are
mapped to other extracted features of the signal by finding relations between
them. Thus, the LG graph describes the individual features of the signal in relation to the entire signal, thus offering a robust methodology for signal description and signal comparison. A database of LG graphs can be used to compare and match the LG graphs of test and reference speech signals in order to
verify the authenticity.
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Fig. 5-8. Maxima-Minima detection in a section of the speech signal

5.3.2.2 Maxima-minima detection
The first step is to extract the local features by detecting the Maxima
and Minima points of the signal. This is done by finding the slope of the
straight line segments that form the signal and identifying points where the
slope of the signal changes. A maximum is defined as the point on the curve
where the tangent changes from positive to negative. A minimum is defined as
the point on a curve where the tangent changes from negative to positive.
Fig.5-8 shows the maxima and minima detection in a section of the presented
speech signal. Similarly, maxima and minima points are identified for the entire speech signal.
5.3.2.3 LG graph representation of the signal
Once all the maxima and minima in the signal have been identified, the
next step is to construct triangles between two minima and one maximum (or
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two maxima and one minimum) in the given signal. Triangles above the zero xaxis are formed by two minima and one maximum while triangles below the
zero x-axis are formed by two maxima and one minimum. This enables us to
describe the signal in the form of triangles of varying sizes. Figs. 5-9 and 5-10
show the representation of a given signal in the form of triangles. We also see
that between the two minima and one maximum (or two maxima and one minimum), that form an approximate triangle, there are points where the slope
changes. At these points the slope either continues to increase towards the
maximum (if the point lies on the part of signal that is approaching a maximum from a minimum) or continues to decrease towards a minimum (if the
point lies on the part of the signal that is approaching a minimum from a maximum). These points, along with the maxima and minima are termed as nodes.
Precisely, points where the slope of the signal changes, are termed as a nodes
and these nodes occur between the two minima and one maximum that form a
triangle.
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Fig. 5-9. Nodes in an approximated triangle from a Speech Sample

Fig. 5-10. Formation of Local Graphs in a Speech Sample
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Fig. 5-11. Formation of Global Graphs in a Speech Sample

Thus we see that the triangles form approximations of the signal at
those points. To make this approximation precisely match the given signal, we
extract features from the nodes that occur in the signal approximated by the
triangles. The features that are extracted from these nodes are explained further. A node given by Ni is represented by:
Ni = {SPi, EPi, øi, Li}
Here, Ni stands for the ith node, SPi stands for the starting point of a
segment joining Nodei, EPi stands for the ending point of a segment joining
Nodei, øi stands for the angle between Nodei and the horizontal axis (slope) and
Li stands for the length of segment joining Nodei.
The relationship between two nodes is given by αij. αij stands for {*Ni, θij,
*Nj}, where, Ni and Nj stand for the two consecutive nodes that occur in the signal and θij stands for the angle “connecting” Nodes i and j.
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Fig. 5-9 shows the occurrence of the nodes in the signal in the approximated triangles. From the features extracted as described before, we construct
the Local Graph (Fig.5-10), which is as shown next:

LGi       
LGi stands for the local graph at the ith node.
From the Local Graphs obtained from the previous step, we generate
the global map, which is as shown next:

Mi ={LG i ,Area i ,x-y of Peak i ,Width of Basei ,...}
di,j ={distance between Mi and M j}
This extracted global map (Fig.5-11) is maintained as a database or can
be matched with the database to establish the authenticity of the speech signal.

5.3.3

FPGA Synthesis Results
In this section, we present the results of FPGA synthesis for the critical

phases of the feature extraction and comparison methodology. The computationally intensive phases of the LG graph methodology, namely feature extraction and graph comparison, are mapped to reconfigurable hardware. Using
Matlab/Simulink we are able to rapidly simulate various partitions of the application on hardware and software. Matlab Simulink provides a hardwaresoftware co-simulation environment where we can execute portions of the applications as software programs and other portions as customized hardware
implementation [103]. The hardware-software co-simulation can be further realized as a hardware-software co-implementation by generating the Hardware
Description Language and bit-streams for FPGA implementation. The IEEE
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compliant VHDL code is generated using Matlab/Simulink blocks and embedded Matlab functions. The FPGA synthesis from the generated VHDL code is
implemented using Xilinx ISE ver. 9.1i. The target FPGA is Vertex 5, specifically xc5vlx30. We have identified the computationally intensive sections of the
LG graph methodology as seen in Table 1 to 4 and we map these sections of the
algorithm onto a reconfigurable fabric.
Table.5-2. presents the results for the FGPA synthesis of the module to
find the derivative, i.e. Δx / Δy, at any given point in the speech signal. Table.5-3. presents the results for the FGPA synthesis of the module to find the
area occupied by each triangular representation of the signal. In case the triangular representation of the signal has more than three nodes as seen in Fig.5-9,
the total area occupied is approximated by the sum of the areas of different
trapezoids that approximate the triangle. Table.5-4. presents the results of the
FPGA synthesis for the module to find the midpoint of a line segment. Table.55. presents the results of FPGA synthesis for the module to find the Euclidean
distance. The Euclidean distance module is used to find (1) the height of the
triangle, i.e. distance from peak to midpoint of base, (2) the length of segments
of the triangle and (3) to compare reference and test patterns. Since the LG
graph of the test signal is compared with the LG graph of the reference signal
in the database, hardware implementation of the comparison module is necessary to speed-up the authentication process. In an ideal case, for a voice biometric of „n‟ samples, we extract (n-2) triangles, (n-2) midpoints, (2n-3) derivatives
and we require (n-2) comparisons per feature for authentication. The presented
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number of clock cycles are specific to a voice biometric consisting of 65535
samples, which will vary if the number of samples differ.

Table 5-2. FPGA Synthesis Results to find the Derivative (Voice Biometric)

Modules to find Derivative
Module to find:
Δx and Δy
Module to find:
Δx / Δy

Slice LUTs
used

Slice LUTs
available

# Clock Cycles

64

19,200

262134

108

19,200

1966005

**The occurrence of a trapezoid is not an ideal case. For ease of understanding, in Table 2,
we present the number of clock cycles to find the area of a single trapezoid region.

Table 5-3. FPGA Synthesis Results to find the Area (Voice Biometric)

Modules to find Total
Area
Module to find:
area of triangle
**Module to find:
area of trapezoid

Slice LUTs
used

Slice LUTs
available

# Clock Cycles

37

19,200

262132

69

19,200

6

Table 5-4. FPGA Synthesis Results to find the Mid-point (Voice Biometric)

Module to find Midpoint of line
Module to find:
Mid-point

Slice LUTs
used

Slice LUTs
available

# Clock Cycles

32

19,200

131066

Table 5-5. FPGA Synthesis Results to find the Euclidean Distance (Voice Biometric)

Modules to find
Euclidean Distance
Module to find:
(x1-x2)2+ (y1-y1)2
Module to find:
Square- root(32 bit)

Slice LUTs
used

Slice LUTs
available

# Clock Cycles per
Feature

139

19,200

458731

180

19,200

65533
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5.3.4 Experimental Set-Up and results
5.3.4.1 Database used

The voice biometric database was provided by Quantum Signal LLC.
The database used consists of utterances from 20 people. Two samples were
obtained from each person, one to construct the reference LG graph and one for
testing purpose. Therefore a total of 40 samples were obtained. Each utterance
consisted of words specific to the person, like a password. All the audio samples are 44.1 kHz, 16-bit mono PCM WAV data. They were recorded using a
Shure microphone.
5.3.4.2 Feature extraction and storage

Each utterance from the reference set is represented as an LG graph.
The speech signal is first pre-processed and features are extracted based on the
LG graph methodology. The extracted features enable us to describe the signal
in the form of triangles as described previously. Since, we do not store the actual voice, but an LG graph representation of the voice, the user need not worry about his or her voice recording being compromised. Though not implemented in the current system, encryption of the database is preferred to address issues related to security.
5.3.4.3 Comparison for authentication

The LG graph representation of the input test signal is compared
against the stored LG graph representation of the reference signal database.
Comparison of the LG graphs of test and reference signals is done by calculating the distance between the two graphs and based on a threshold ε, the au147

thenticity is established. The threshold ε is determined experimentally and is
defined by the set { ε1, ε2, ε3, …. εN }, that are the thresholds for the individual
features, and „N‟ stands for the number of features extracted to form the LG
graph representation. The graph pair that produces the minimum distance
measure which is within the threshold ε is accepted to be a match to establish
the authenticity of the test signal. The distance measure is calculated per feature vector per pattern, i.e., the triangular representation of the speech signal.
Along with a match of the feature vectors of reference and test signals,
the location of the pattern in the two signals must also match. Based on these
criteria, the test signal is verified for authenticity. Since we are working in the
time domain, dynamic time warping is used to align the extracted feature vectors corresponding to reference and test speech signals. The flow charts for
enrollment and verification stages are as shown in Fig.5-12.
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Fig. 5-12. Voice Biometric Enrollment and Verification Stages

5.3.4.4 Dynamic time warping
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) allows a non-linear mapping of one
signal to another by minimizing the distance between the two. This means that
two time series that are similar but locally out of phase can be aligned in a nonlinear manner. In spite of its O(n2) time complexity, DTW is the best solution
known for time series problems in a variety of domains like speech processing,
data mining, pattern matching etc [50]. In our work, we use DTW to align the
extracted reference and test feature vectors to produce the minimum distance
possible for the purpose of authentication.
5.3.4.5 Results of implementation

The experiments were carried out on the samples in the database. The
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program, written in Matlab, is interactive and prompts the user through a series of steps to establish authenticity. The threshold ε is pre-determined experimentally, and is hard-coded in the program. Distance measures based on absolute difference and Euclidean distance were also considered in our experimentation. The choice of distance measure was found to govern the value of
the threshold ε. A relaxed threshold may result in misclassification of the test
signal while a very conservative threshold may result in rejection of a genuine
test signal. Since the claim of identity is assumed prior to verification of the
speaker, the accuracy is increased while reducing the search space by eliminating search through the entire database and thus decreasing time taken for
comparison.
For the purpose of experimentation, area and height features were calculated from the triangular representations of reference and test speech signals.
Fig.5-13 shows the minimum distances between reference and test samples for
the area feature vector. Fig. 5-14 shows the minimum distances between reference and test samples for the height feature vector. Each set (1 to 20) consists of
a pair of speech samples, i.e., a reference and a test speech sample. For example, in Fig.5-13, column against set 1 corresponds to the distance between the
area feature vectors of reference and test samples in set 1. Similarly, in Fig. 514, the column against set 10 corresponds to the distance between the height
feature vectors of reference and test samples in set 10. Depending on the threshold value , the accuracy is established. Since we are minimizing the distance,
feature vectors that have greater distances are considered to be a mismatch
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while feature vectors that produce a minimum distance are considered an acceptable match.

Fig. 5-13. Minimizing distance between reference & test sample for “area” feature (threshold at 15)

For example, in Fig 5-13 and 5-14, having a threshold at 75% results in
an accuracy of 90%. This means a threshold value of 15 (75% of 20) for the area
feature vector distance and a threshold value of 22.5 (75% of 30) for the height
feature vector distance results in 90% accuracy in authentication. All the values
less than the threshold are accepted as a match while values greater than the
threshold are rejected.

Fig. 5-14. Minimizing distance between reference & test sample for “height” feature
(threshold at 22.5)

In order to gain further insight, we compared the performance of our
methodology with FFT based correlation technique for pattern recognition.
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Fig.5-15 shows the results of maximizing correlation between test and reference
signals from the same database. The correlation values shown are normalized.
A correlation value of 1.0 is considered as a perfect match. In this case, a threshold on correlation is set up such that signals with maximum correlation are
considered an acceptable match while signals that produce lesser correlation
values are considered to be a mismatch. In Fig.5-15 below, having a threshold
at 75% will result in an authentication accuracy of 85%. All the values lesser
than the threshold are rejected while values greater than the threshold are accepted as match. Thus we observe that the LG graph methodology is not only
comparable in performance to a classic FFT based correlation technique for pattern recognition but also has better accuracy.

Fig. 5-15. Maximizing correlation values between reference & test samples

5.3.5

Conclusion
In this section, we described a method for LG graph representation of

the speech signal and its application to authentication. We presented the results
of the FPGA synthesis of the computationally intensive phases of the methodology, namely feature extraction and graph comparison. We also presented
the authentication results on a limited database as a proof of concept and com152

pared the results to a correlation based technique. Experimentally, we observed
that the LG graph methodology is more accurate when compared to the FFT
based correlation technique. The FPGA implementation of the critical phases of
the LG graph methodology is necessary to reduce the software overhead while
increasing speed.
Future work includes experimenting using an extensive database composed of more complex speech patterns. A detailed analysis of the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) is necessary to take this preliminary investigation to the next level of full scale implementation. Manual
optimization of the VHDL code generated using Matlab Simulink blocks and
embedded functions is necessary to enhance performance of the synthesized
FPGA modules. A cycle accurate simulation is necessary to quantify the tradeoff between hardware-software co-implementation and a pure software implementation. Furthermore, an encryption of the database would be preferred
to address security related issues.

5.4

LG Graph based Fingerprint Biometric Authentication
Fingerprint biometrics is by far the most widely deployed identification

and authentication technique. Most of the fingerprint based biometric authentication schemes either rely on minutiae information or on ridge information to
establish authenticity of the subject. Invariance to elastic distortion during fingerprint matching is an open problem that has not been completely addressed
by these methodologies. In this direction, we offer a unique Local-Global (LG)
graph methodology [43] [89] for authenticating the presented fingerprint im153

age. The LG graph methodology seeks to combine the minutiae information
with the ridge feature information to enhance the robustness and reliability of
the fingerprint matching process. Features from the individual ridges in the
pre-processed fingerprint image are first extracted to represent the local graph.
The individual ridges are also referred to as regions and used interchangeably
in this paper. The local information extracted from these regions includes region starting, region ending, ridge bifurcation and region centroid. Euclidean
distances between the individual regions‟ centroids is calculated and
represented as a distance matrix to form the global graph. Thus, a combination
of the local information combined with the global distance matrix yields the LG
graph representation of the fingerprint image. This LG graph representation of
the reference or enrolled fingerprint image is stored in a database. For subject
verification, an LG graph is extracted from the presented test fingerprint image
and compared with the corresponding LG graph in the database. Comparison
is achieved by calculating the absolute difference between the two graphs and
based on a threshold, the authenticity of the subject is established.
The database used in our experiments was obtained online from [44].
The fingerprints were synthetically generated by using SFinGe [45]. The image
size is 240x320 pixels, and 8 bit depth. The parameters of the synthetic generator were tuned to emulate a low-cost sensor with a small acquisition area.

5.4.1 Pre-processing the Fingerprint Image
The LG graph methodology relies on successful extraction of the individual ridges. Therefore, pre-processing the fingerprint image is critical prior
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to extraction of the LG graph from the fingerprint image. The important steps
in pre-processing include image binarization, skeletonization and elimination
of spurious regions. The acquired fingerprint image has a bi-modal histogram
as seen in Fig.5-16. Hence it is easy to set up a hard threshold to binarize and
generate a negative of the acquired image.

Fig. 5-16. Bi-modal histogram of the synthetic fingerprint image

Fig.5-17(a) shows the acquired fingerprint image and Fig.5-17(b) shows
the binarized negative of the acquired fingerprint image. The next step is to
skeletonize the binary image and eliminate spurious regions. This is achieved
by implementing an “OPEN” operation on the binary image followed by thinning operation. “OPEN” operation reduces false minutiae while making sure
that previously unconnected regions remain unconnected. The result of skeletonization operation on Fig.5-17(b) is shown in Fig.5-18(a). We then apply connected component labeling algorithm with 8-neighbor connectivity to isolate
different regions and remove regions that have pixel count lesser than a pre155

determined threshold, thus eliminating spurious regions. This resultant image
is as shown in Fig.5-18(b). After this pre-processing of the fingerprint image is
completed, the LG graph is then extracted from the pre-processed image.

(a)

(b)

Fig. 5-17. (a) Sample synthetic fingerprint image (b) Binarizing the fingerprint image to
obtain its negative

(a)

(b)

Fig. 5-18. (a) Thinning the fingerprint image (b) Eliminating spurious regions
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5.4.2 Applying LG Graph Methodology
The graph is a more accurate representation of an object. The LG graph
offers an incremental methodology for efficiently representing images via their
visible features and the features‟ relationships. The LG graph embeds both the
local information, i.e., region description, and the global information, i.e., the
topology of the image. Thus, here the LG graph is capable of describing the features contained in the fingerprint image.
The main components of the LG graph are: (i) the local graph that
represents the information related with region magnitude, region centroid,
ridge bifurcation, ridge ending points, ridge starting points, local distance matrix and (ii) the global graph that represents the relationships among the different regions for the entire image (global distance matrix). The local and global
distance matrices consist of Euclidean distances between the features of interest. The local-global image graph components, with respect to the preprocessed
fingerprint image are briefly described below.
The Region or Local Graph L holds information of the fingerprint
ridges (or regions). L is given by:
L = N1ac12N2ac23N3 … Nkack1N1  Ni apijNj … NnardnmNm …
where,  represents the graph relationship operator, and each Ni maintains
the structural features of the corresponding fingerprint ridges, i.e., Ni = { location (l), orientation (o), magnitude (m), ridge centroid (rc), ridge starting point
(rsp), ridge ending point (rep), ridge bifurcation points (rbp), number of bifurcations (nb), local distance matrix (ldm) }, and each aij holds the relationships
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among these regions, i.e., aij = { relative distance (rd), relative orientation (ro),
relative magnitude (rm) }.
The Global Graph G is also a part of the LG graph by offering additional information about the fingerprint regions and their connectivity. G is given
by:
G = K1ac12K2ac23K3 … KkackqKq  Ki apijKj …  KnardnmKm …
where,  represents the graph relationship operator, and each Ki maintains the
structural features of the corresponding fingerprint region on a global scale.
Thus, Ki = { location (l), orientation (o), magnitude (m), ridge centroid (rc),
ridge starting point (rsp), ridge ending point (rep), ridge bifurcation points
(rbp), number of bifurcations (nb), global distance matrix (gdm) },

and aij

holds the relationships among these regions. Thus, aij = { relative distance (rd),
relative orientation (ro), relative magnitude (rm) }.
The ridge starting and ending points are discovered using the hit-ormiss structuring elements. These structuring elements traverse the fingerprint
image in a raster scan and identify the ridge starting and ending points, based
on matching the patterns as depicted in Fig.5-19. The 8 structuring elements
account for the 8 neighbors to the pixel in consideration, thus identifying the
ridge starting and ending points in 8 different orientations.
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Fig. 5-19. Hit or Miss structuring elements to identify ridge ending/starting points

Similarly, the ridge bifurcations are also discovered using the hit-ormiss structuring elements. These structuring elements traverse the fingerprint
image in a raster scan and identify the ridge bifurcations, based on matching
the 8 patterns as depicted in Fig.5-20.

Fig. 5-20. Hit or Miss (x - don’t care) structuring elements to identify ridge ending/starting points

Individual regions (or ridges) can be isolated by using the connected
component labeling technique using the 8 neighbor connectivity as explained
before. A region‟s centroid is calculated by averaging the region‟s pixel positions. The region (or ridge) centroid calculated by averaging its pixel positions
may not necessarily lie within the region and may be located outside the re159

gion. Therefore, the calculated centroid is projected back into the region (or
ridge) by choosing a point on the ridge having the least Euclidean distance
from the calculated centroid. The point on the ridge with the least Euclidean
distance from the calculated centroid is chosen as the ridge (or region) centroid.
Fig.5-21 shows an isolated region, its corresponding region centroid and its
starting and ending points. Fig.5-22 shows the centroids of all the different regions.

Fig. 5-21. Isolation of a single ridge, its centroid, its end and start points

A local distance matrix is computed based on the Euclidean distances
between the region‟s centroid and its corresponding starting, ending and region bifurcation points. The magnitude of the region is obtained by counting
the number of pixels in the region. The regions are then ranked based on their
magnitude in descending order and a Euclidean distance matrix is calculated
based on the location of the regions‟ centroids. The distance matrix represents
the relative distances between different regions on a global scale. Fig.5-23
shows the Global graph that connects all the regions‟ centroids. Fig. 5-23 is
shown as a negative of Fig. 5-22 to enable better viewing of the Global graph.
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The relative magnitude can be obtained by dividing all the regions‟ magnitude
values by the magnitude value of the biggest region.

Fig. 5-22. Centroids of different regions (centroids highlighted as squares)

Fig. 5-23. Connecting the centroids to form a Global graph

Thus in the LG graph methodology explained in this section, we effec161

tively combine the local minutiae features with the corresponding ridge description and map them on a global scale to enable a robust representation of
the fingerprint image for the purpose of authentication.

5.4.3 LG Graph Comparison
During enrollment, the fingerprint image of the subject is preprocessed, represented as an LG graph and stored in the system database as a
reference. For verification, the subject‟s fingerprint image is pre-processed,
represented as an LG graph and compared against the corresponding reference
LG graph in the database. The reference LG graph corresponds to the identity
claimed by the subject. Comparison is implemented by calculating the absolute
difference between the two graphs and based on a threshold, the authenticity is
established.
This threshold, ε is determined experimentally and is defined by the set
{ ε1, ε2, ε3, …. εN }, that are the thresholds for the individual features (e.g., normalized magnitude of regions, local distance matrix for the corresponding region, global distance matrix, etc), and „N‟ stands for the number of features extracted to form the LG graph representation. As mentioned previously, the local and global distance matrices consist of the Euclidean distances between the
features of interest. The graph pair that produces the minimum distance measure, i.e., minimum sum of absolute differences between the two graphs, that is
within the threshold ε is accepted to be a match that establishes the authenticity
of the test image, thus verifying the subject. The threshold enables us to accommodate slight variations between the reference and test images. A wider
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threshold can accommodate larger variations in the test image that may occur
due to elastic distortion, but may also result in wrong authentication. A narrow
threshold may result in rejection of a valid test image. Therefore, the selection
of the threshold is critical in determining results of authentication. Though the
LG graph is capable of describing the fingerprint image using all the features
mentioned in Section.3, in our experiments, we currently compare the global
distance matrices and the local distance matrices of the test and reference fingerprint images to enable authentication. The local distance matrices are computed for each ridge by calculating the Euclidean distances from the region‟s
centroid to the ridge starting, ending and bifurcation points. The global distance matrix is computed for all the ridges by calculating the Euclidean distances between the regions‟ centroids.

5.4.4 FPGA Synthesis Results
In order to decrease the time required to establish authenticity of the
subject and to eliminate software overhead, we need hardware implementation
to accelerate critical sections of the algorithm. The most compute intensive section of our LG graph methodology is the hit-or-miss operation to identify the
ridge ending, ridge starting and ridge bifurcations. The implementation of
these structuring elements can be parallelized and implemented on reconfigurable logic to improve the performance of the methodology. The algorithm is
implemented using Matlab/Simulink, using which we are able to rapidly simulate the application as hardware-software portions. Matlab/Simulink provides a hardware-software co-simulation environment where we can execute
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portions of the applications as software programs and other portions as customized hardware implementation [103]. The IEEE compliant VHDL code is generated using Matlab Simulink blocks and embedded Matlab functions. The
FPGA synthesis from the generated VHDL code is implemented using Xilinx
ISE ver. 9.1i. The target FPGA is Vertex 5, specifically xc5vlx30.
Table.5-6. presents the results of FPGA synthesis for the module to implement the hit-or-miss operation to identify the ridge end, start and bifurcations. All the 16 structuring elements depicted in Fig. 5-19 and 5-20 are implemented in parallel for each pixel in consideration. The nine pixels in the 3x3
structuring element (8 neighbors + pixel in consideration) are buffered and fed
to the FPGA module. The 16 binary output values are either 1, if there is a
match for the structuring element, or 0, if there is no match. The center pixel
position in the 3x3 window corresponding to the matching structuring element
is buffered, tagged as start, end or bifurcation point and stored in the LG
graph. The total number of clock cycles to implement this operation will be
76800, since the size of the image is 240x320 pixels, and the 16 hit-or-miss operations will consume 1 clock cycle when implemented in parallel. The boundary
extension of the image will be handled by zero padding.

Table 5-6. FPGA Synthesis of Hit-or-Miss Operations (Fingerprint Biometric)

FPGA Module

Slice LUTs
Used

Slice LUTs
available

# Clock Cycles

16 Parallel
Hit-or-Miss Operations

45

19,200

76800
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5.4.5 Testing the LG Graph Methodology
To enable robust and reliable authentication, the LG graph methodology has to exhibit invariance to scaling, translational and rotational effects in the
test fingerprint image as compared to its corresponding reference fingerprint
image. But in our case, scaling and translational effects are not considered because it is not inherent in the fingerprint image acquisition process. However
we have to test for rotational invariance within permissible limits.
In order to test our methodology for rotational invariance, rotational
variations equal to +/- 15 degrees in steps of 1 degree, were introduced in the
test images that had a corresponding reference in the database. Rotation greater than +/- 15 degrees may result in loss of information because the fingerprint
acquisition system may not be able to completely and correctly scan the finger
to generate the necessary image. Although image rotation does not change the
result of ridge extraction and graph representation, it changes the location of
the regions‟ centroids. The LG graph methodology is invariant to rotation because we consider relative Euclidean distances between the different ridges‟
centroids and not the pixel co-ordinates of the regions‟ centroids to construct
the global distance matrix. Also, the local graph corresponding to each ridge or
region is computed as a Euclidean distance matrix between the region‟s centroid and its corresponding ridge start, end and bifurcation points. Thus, the local
distance matrix contains only the relative distances and not the pixel coordinates. Further, we rank the regions based on their magnitude in descending order. Magnitude based ranking makes the distance mapping between re165

gions rotationally invariant, since distances between regions are calculated
based on their magnitude, with the biggest region as a reference, as opposed to
calculating distances based solely on the location of the regions' centroids.
In our experiments, with rotational variation ranging from -15 to +15
degrees, we obtained 100% accuracy in authentication. It is to be noted that
100% authentication results are based on the fact that the acquired fingerprint
image undergoes ideal preprocessing with ideal extraction of the individual
ridges. The extraction of the individual ridges is independent of rotation involved but is heavily dependent on distortion due to noise. Distortion due to
noise may give rise to false minutiae or improper ridge isolation, i.e., two or
more ridges being connected as one region, which ultimately leads to wrong
authentication results.
Fig.5-24. shows the various stages in fingerprint enrollment and verification in the form of a flow chart.
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Fig. 5-24. Fingerprint Biometric Enrollment and Verification Stages

5.4.6 Conclusion
In this article, we described a method for LG graph representation of
the fingerprint image and its application to fingerprint biometric authentication. We presented the results of FPGA synthesis of compute intensive sections
of the LG graph methodology, namely identification of ridge start, end and bifurcations as applied to fingerprint biometric authentication. The experiments
presented in our work are based on a limited database of synthetic fingerprint
images. Further work in this direction will be to experiment using an extensive
database of real fingerprint images along with a detailed analysis of the False
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Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR). Statistics of loops,
arches and whorls can also be used along with the presented ridge attributes to
better describe the fingerprint biometric for the purpose of LG graph construction. Cycle accurate simulation is necessary to quantify the tradeoff between
hardware-software co-implementation and a pure software implementation.
Though not implemented in this work, database encryption is preferred to address security related issues.

5.5

Performance Analysis
Biometric algorithms, implemented using C/C++ or any high level lan-

guages are similar to the Simulated Benchmark Programs (SBPs) presented in
Section 3.3.7. The biometric algorithms will essentially be comprised of multiplication, division, addition and subtraction operations as seen in the SBPs.
Therefore the performance analysis of the biometric algorithms will yield results similar to the SBPs presented in Section 3.3.7. We observe an increase in
CPI due to SCAN encryption and decryption of instructions and data. The percentage increase in CPI due to SCAN encryption is around 52% for the SBPs
which will also hold true for the biometric algorithms which run on SCAN-SP.

168

6

CHAPTER SIX
This dissertation work describes research related to the design and per-

formance analysis of a secure processor SCAN-SP with crypto-biometric capabilities. This chapter summarizes the contributions made in this dissertation
and provides directions for possible future work.

6.1

Contributions
In the course of this research work, several contributions were made as

listed below:
1. A survey on secure processor architectures in the industry and in
the academia as described in Chapter 2.
2. Enhancement of the SparcV8 processor architecture to incorporate
pipelined decryption and encryption of instructions and data, along
with compiler modifications to enable random number generator
seed management and SCAN key management as described in
Chapter 3.
3. Design and synthesis of FPGA to accelerate computationally intensive sections of the SCAN encryption, information hiding and compression algorithms, along with a new instruction set to interface
the cryptographic FPGA with the SparcV8 architecture also described in Chapter 3.
4. A survey on various biometric based identification and/or authen169

tication techniques based on Neural Networks described in chapter
4.
5. Development of Local-Global graph methodology based algorithms
to enable voice, iris and fingerprint based biometric authentication,
FPGA synthesis of computationally intensive sections of the algorithms and a new instruction set to interface the biometric FPGA
with the SparcV8 architecture as described in Chapter 5.

6.2

Future Work
As demonstrated in this work, the proposed secure processor architec-

ture is a feasible approach to enable secure computing. SCAN-Secure Processor
can be effectively implemented to secure data and code in an embedded environment. Alternatively, it can also be implemented to secure networking
nodes. Biometric authentication capabilities of the SCAN-SP make it a viable
solution that can be incorporated in various access control and security applications. Mobile products like cell phones that enable secure transactions like mobile banking can benefit by incorporating the SCAN-SP as the processing unit.
Further work in this direction can involve exploring a single chip ASIC
solution where the microcontroller core and the crypto-engine are integrated to
avoid concerns relating to the security of the co-processor and eliminate delay
in data transfer. Physical mechanism to erase RNG seeds and SCAN key due to
tampering needs to be further explored, which will be a part of actual chip
packaging. Multi-modal biometrics can also be explored in order to provide
more reliable subject authentication. Attack simulation to provide a full scale
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vulnerability analysis of the SCAN-Secure Processor is necessary in order to
evaluate the security of the proposed architecture.
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